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1.1 Background and Introduction  
The Agreement on Agriculture1 (AoA or referred to as ‘the agreement’) was agreed upon during 
the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT 1994). It came into 
effect when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was formed on 1 January 1995. The agreement 
regulates trade in agricultural products and produce, between all Members of the WTO and applies 
to all equally. However, a distinction is sometimes drawn between developing and developed 
countries.2 
 
The AoA establishes a number of generally applicable rules with regard to trade-related 
agricultural measures, primarily in the areas of market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies.3 ‘These rules in particular relate to country-specific commitments to improve market 
access and reduce trade-distorting subsidies which are contained in the individual country 
schedules of WTO Members and constitute an integral part of the GATT.’4 This means that the 
agreement has to be implemented by members making changes to their domestic policy to bring it 
in line with the agreement. 
 
While the agreement sets out the general rules and commitments that states must follow, ‘it does 
not include within it specific quantitative commitments on a country by country and commodity 
by commodity basis.’5 A major objective of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations is the quantitative 
                                                          
1 Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2. 
2 Elamin, Pearce and Sharma, The FAO Resource Manual on Agreement on Agriculture provides introductory analysis 
of various market access provisions. 
3 ‘Agriculture: Explanation, Introduction’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro01_intro_e.htm, accessed on 20 May 2015. 
4 Ibid. 




commitments. These are included in the country schedules which each member is required to 
commit to and submit to the WTO.6 The core goal of any trade agreement in the WTO is to bring 
about trade liberalisation and put all countries on the same footing when it comes to trade. The 
AoA sets out three main pillars of trade: market access, domestic support and export subsidies.7 
 
Market access primarily deals with import of goods and the rules and commitments relating to 
such. ‘Its purpose is to expand trade by preventing various non-tariff barriers and by binding and 
reducing tariffs.’8 In the WTO context, ‘market access’ is about both obligations and rights.9 This 
means that states have an obligation to offer market access to their goods to other states but, in 
turn, they have the right to have market access to the goods of other states. Market access has four 
important elements, ‘tariffication, tariff reduction, market access provisions that oblige countries 
to provide ‘low’ import tariffs for a fixed quota of imports.’10  
 
Article 9 of the AoA11 discusses export subsidies. It states that export subsidies must be reduced 
and that these are commitments under the agreement.12 Export subsidies refer to financial support 
from the state for producers that have a surplus; this enables them to export their goods at a lower 
cost.13 Agriculture receives preferential treatment over other commodities as export subsidies are 
still allowed; however, the agreement introduced limits, whereas none existed before.14 The 
fundamental reason why export subsidies were introduced is because it causes a lot of damage to 
exporting countries and reduces their market share and export earnings. This mostly affects 
                                                          
6 http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7814e/w7814e07, accessed on 20 May 2015. 
7 Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2. 
8 http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7814e/w7814e07, accessed on 20 May 2015. 
9 Elamin, Pearce and Sharma,FAO Resource Manual on Agreement on Agriculture provides introductory analysis of 
various market access provisions. 
10 ‘Main elements of the Agreement on Agriculture’ available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7814e/w7814e06.htm#chapter2themainelementsoftheagreementonagriculture, accessed 
on 21 May 2015. 
11 Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 William DJ. , Jackson JH., The Future of International Economic Law: Business & Economics (2008)326. 
14 ‘Main elements of the Agreement on Agriculture’ available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7814e/w7814e06.htm#chapter2themainelementsoftheagreementonagriculture, accessed 




developing countries such as those within the Cairns group and on the African continent.15 
Countries with a low level of self-sufficiency may experience overall welfare gains when export 
subsidies are introduced. Generally, consumer gains should more than often offset producer losses; 
however, this is influenced by the extent to which export subsidies destabalise markets.16 
 
The main goal of domestic support is to raise producers’ income and maintain the profitability of 
domestic farming. Financial assistance from 
 the state enables producers to compete on the global market. However, this is limited due to the 
fact that countries with strong economies can provide more support to their producers and thus 
dominate the international market. Domestic support can be broken up into three categories two 
of which are not restricted. The Green Box measures are assumed not to affect production and are 
therefore not considered trade-distorting. They are acceptable under the AoA and are not subjected 
to reduction.17 The Blue Box category includes measures such as direct payments to farmers that 
are intended to limit production.18 These are also considered acceptable and are not subject to 
reduction, but are between the green and the amber box.19 The category which is restricted is the 
controversial Amber Box. These are measures that are considered trade-distorting and are therefore 
subjected to reduction; however support is still allowed, although reduced.20 Measures such as 
price support and import subsidies impact production. 
 
As noted earlier, WTO agreements do make exceptions for countries depending on their 
developmental level. The organisation has no set definition of developed or developing countries. 
Rather, countries themselves declare whether they are developed, developing or least developed. 
The declared status may be challenged by another member state.21 Such status is highly relevant 
and has a significant effect, particularly in respect of agriculture. On the other hand, the United 
                                                          
15Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 ‘Agriculture: Explanation, Domestic Support’ available at 




21 ‘Development: Definition, Who are developing countries availbale at 




Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) have their own methods to determine development status 
and disagree on the definition of a developing or least developed nation. According to the UN, 
there is no set definition whilst the WB definition is heavily dependent on gross national income 
(GNI) per capita.22 ‘Countries with a GNI per capita of less than $1005 are classified as low-
income countries, those with between $1,006 and $3,975 as lower middle income countries, those 
with between $3,976 and $12,275 as upper middle income countries, and those with incomes of 
more than $12,276 as high-income countries.’23 This scale has a significant impact on the 
classification of countries as least developed or developing.  
 
However, the list of the least developed countries (LDCs) is decided upon based on 
recommendations by the Committee for Development policy to the UN Economic and Social 
Council and, ultimately, the General Assembly which make the decision.24 The basic criteria for 
inclusion are an economic vulnerability index, a human assets index and certain thresholds with 
regard to per capita GNI.25 While space constraints do not allow for detailed discussion of  this,26  
in a nutshell, developed countries are more industrialised, and have higher income per capita, more 
developed economies and higher levels of technological advancement than developing countries 
and in particular, have an overall higher standard of living.27  Such countries include the United 
States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland and The Netherlands, to 
name but a few.28  On the other and, developing countries have under-developed industries, and a 
lower standard of living and human development index.29 These countries are mainly found in 
                                                          
22 Library of congress collections policy statements, available at http://www.loc.gov/acq/devpol/devcountry.pdf, 
accessed on 12 May 2015. 
23 ‘Country classification, Data sources, country classifications and aggregation methodology’ available at  




26 This study is primarily concerned with the status of a state which is self-determined; it therefore does not engage in 
further discussion on GNI and how it comes about. 
27 ‘What is the difference between developing and developed countries’ 
http://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/4940/what-is-the-difference-between-developed-countries-and-
developing-countries, accessed on 28 May 2015. 
28 ‘World economic outlook’ available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf, accessed on 
28 May 2015. 
29 ‘What is the difference between developing and developed countries’ 
http://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/4940/what-is-the-difference-between-developed-countries-and-




Asia and Africa and include India, South Africa (SA), Burma, Tunisia, etc.30 The WTO recognizes 
countries that are not considered to be developed as developing and least developed, each with 
their own benefits and commitments under the agreement. The difference in these groups’ level of 
development is linked to their ability to compete in the multilateral trading system. This is 
especially true of agriculture. The major distinction between the developed; developing and least 
developing states is that the commitments of the agreement differ and are far less for the latter 
group. One such commitment which demands less (which some may argue is a massive benefit of 
the classification) is Article 6 para 231 of the AoA where the following two important exemptions 
for developing countries from domestic support reduction commitments are set out: 
 ‘investment subsidies which are generally available to agriculture; and 
 Agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor 
producers.’32 
 
Thus, domestic support meeting these criteria is not required to be included in the calculation of 
the current aggregate measurement of support (AMS). Least-developed countries, on the other 
hand, are exempt from all domestic support reduction commitments, but may not exceed the total 
AMS established for the base period (1986-88).33 The reason is the different economic situations 
within these countries. Developing countries are not as economically strong and stable as 
developed countries. There are thus significant differences in the structure and goals of their 
agricultural policies. While developed countries continue to subsidise agricultural producers, 
developing countries have tended to tax the agricultural sector, rather than support it.34 
 
Another difference lies is the reduction of total AMS which is 20%  for developed countries, and 
13.3% for developing and least developed countries, with 0% for the implementation period of 10 
years.35 These exceptions are not absolute and certain requirements have to be met.36 Annex 2 of 
                                                          
30 ‘World economic outlook’ available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf accessed on 
28 May 2015. 
31 Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2. 
32 Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2. 
33 http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7814e/w7814e07, accessed on 10 August 2015. 
34 Ibid. 





the AoA states that the exemption must have ‘no or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or 
effects on production.’37 The agreement goes onto state that support must be through a publicly-
funded government programme. This programme must not involve transfers from consumers and 
price support to producers should not be an effect of such a programme.38 Further policy conditions 
are set out in annex 2 that are not discussed here but must be complied with. 
 
Payments directly under production limiting programs, rural development in developing countries, 
certain government assistance to encourage agricultural, and other support that is only a small 
proportion (5% for developed countries, and 10% for developing countries) of the value of 
production of individual products or the value of total agricultural production are other policies 
which are not included in the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support reduction commitments.39 
 
However, there are substantial differences between the figures for domestic support set out in the 
agreement and the targets for countries’ legally binding “schedules” of commitments.’40  For 
example, under market access, the average tariff cut for all agricultural products was 36% for 
developed and 24% for developing countries with a minimum cut per product of 15% and 10%, 
respectively.41 The same applies to export subsidies, where the agreement states:  
 
‘Reduce the values of mainly direct export subsidies to 36% below the 1986-90 base period level 
over the six-year implementation period, and the quantity of subsidized exports by 21% over the 
same period. The reduction in values for developing countries will be two-thirds of the reduction 
for developed countries and will be carried out over a 10-year period. Least-developed countries 
are exempted.’42 











Thus, despite treating members the same and seeking to balance trade dynamics, the WTO takes 
the global and economic positions of states into account and to level the playing field. This ensures 
optimal benefit for all and no unfair advantage or disadvantage to any member state. The 
distinction between member states is important not only for the AoA but for all Agreements under 
the WTO. 
 
1.2 Preliminary Literature Review and Motivation for the Study 
‘Agriculture basically created civilization as we know it.  In fact, using anthropologists’ definition 
of civilization, farming was a prerequisite for civilization in every part of the world.’43 Agriculture 
is one of the most positive ways of surviving and earning an income in a world where money is 
hard to come by. It is relatively easier than other trades, requires less capacity and funds in some 
cases, is not skills intensive and is accessible to the poorest of the poor. People are not only able 
to feed themselves but are able to start small businesses and in some cases expand into the local 
market. Vast amounts of land are available in most countries and while citizens might not have the 
resources to use it for construction and other purposes, they are able to farm. Therefore agriculture 
is fundamental to humankind’s survival not only because it provides food, but due to its potential 
to improve the lives of the local farmers. 
 
Agriculture is a substantial part of global multilateral trade. In 2013, the value of global exports of 
agricultural goods stood at UD$1 745 billion.44 In March 2015, SA recorded its highest ever export 
of agricultural goods.45 Globally, more than 148 270 710 tonnes of wheat are imported and 
exported annually, together with products such as soybeans and maize. Thus, global trade in 
agricultural goods is important to both developing and developed countries. 
                                                          
43 ‘Positive effects of Agriculture’ available at http://www.waldeneffect.org/blog/The_positive_effects_of_agriculture 
accessed, on 16 June 2015. 
44 http://faostat.fao.org/desktopdefault.aspx?pageid=342&lang=en&country=202 accessed on 8 August 2015. 






Economic growth is the cornerstone of poverty reduction and agriculture is the engine of economic 
growth in most African countries. Approximately 65% of Africans rely on agriculture as their 
primary source of livelihood and more than 90% of the continent’s agricultural products are 
produced by small-scale farmers.46 SA exports in excess of $25 Billion47 worth of agricultural 
products annually.48 In 2015, five of the top 10 countries that SA exports agricultural goods to are 
members of the European Union (EU),49 including the United Kingdom (14%), The Netherlands 
(11%), Germany (4%), Belgium (4%) and Italy (2%). Other countries in the top 10 include 
Zimbabwe, Japan, the United Sates and Mozambique.50  In 2011, maize accounted for the highest 
volume of agricultural exports from SA at 2 563 159 tonnes, followed by wine, oranges, grapes 
and apples.51 SA also imports agricultural products to the value of around $16.7 billion each year,52 
including wheat, soybean and palm oil. 53  
 
 In 2013 alone, the EU exported €118 Billion worth of agricultural products.54 Wine tops the list 
at 7 417 993 tonnes per year followed closely by Food Prep Nes, whole milk cheese and pork.55 
Although European imports are dropping, they still amount to more than €100 Billion worth of 
agricultural products per annum56 and include Food Prep Nes, whole milk cheese and wine.57 
                                                          
46 ‘Agriculture’s critical role in Africa’s development’ available at  http://www.ifpri.org/publication/agriculture-s-
critical-role-africa-s-development, accessed on 12 August 2015. 
47 Daya Y., South African agricultural exports: trends, composition, direction and potential, directorate international 
trade: trade research desk available at http://www.daff.gov.za/researchp/saagricexp.pdf, accessed on 9 August 2015. 
48 This figure is for year 2005. Agricultural exports have increased since then. 
49 Daya Y., South African agricultural exports: trends, composition, direction and potential, directorate international 




53 http://faostat.fao.org/desktopdefault.aspx?pageid=342&lang=en&country=202, accessed on 8 August 2015. 
54 ‘Statistical and economic information report, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development,’ 
December 2013 available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/agricultural/2013/pdf/full-report_en.pdf, 








Agriculture is not only important for import and export purposes. Many households survive on 
their own produce or the profit from farming. In SA 19.9% of households rely on subsistence and 
commercial agriculture for survival.58 It is estimated that about 4 million South Africans survive 
on their own produce.59 Agriculture is thus crucial for food security in a country with high poverty 
rates. Indeed, in many developing countries, it is the only means of livelihood. In countries such 
as Zambia and Uganda, large sections of the population rely on subsistence farming and 
agricultural trade and agricultural goods are the main export.60 Although this model is less 
successful in sub-Saharan Africa due to population growth, it is still practiced due to the lack of 
alternatives.61 More than 80 years ago, Eleanor Roosevelt observed that, ‘The objective of 
subsistence farming is not to compete with regular farming or add to the burden of agricultural 
overproduction. The idea is that families engaged in subsistence farming consume their own 
garden products locally instead of sending them to distant markets.’62 This illustrates the 
importance of this form of agriculture not only to the developing, but the developed world as her 
remarks were directed at citizens of the United States. However, Vandana Shiva argues that free 
market economics threatens these marginalised groups of farmers who often receive very little 
government support.63 Of the 12.1 million farmers in the EU, 5.1 million are subsistence farmers, 
mainly in eastern European countries such as Romania and countries like Hungary and Bulgaria.64  
 
Food security, from agricultural activity, both imported and locally grown, is thus a global 
phenomenon that spans the developing and developed world. It needs to be considered in 
                                                          
58 ‘Agricultural statistics’ available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=735&id=4&paged=3, accessed on 16 
August 2015. 
59 Aliber M., Exploring Statistics South Africa’s National Household Surveys as sources of information about 
household-level food security. Agrekon Vol. 48:4. 2009.  
60 ‘Subsistence farming’ available at http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Subsistence_farming, accessed on 
16 August 2015. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Roosevelt E., Subsistence Farmsteads Forum 91 (Apr. 1934): 199-201. From the Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, 
1934. Retrieved 11 August 2007. 
63 Shiva V., Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development. Zed Books, 1989. ISBN 0862328233 8-12. 
64 ‘Semi Subsistence farming and small farms in the EU’ available at http://www.arc2020.eu/2013/06/semi-




examining the AoA as trade affects the way people access food and determines whether it is 
healthy, sustainably sourced, and nutritional and whether they are able to make informed food 
choices (food security).65 
 
Agriculture is not only important for citizens’ survival in countries with a large number of 
subsistence farmers but for the prosperity of the nation as a whole, as many countries rely on 
agricultural exports to sustain their economies. Tobacco accounts for 74% of Malawi’s exports 
and more than 23.8% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP),66 and agricultural exports make up 
12.3% of Gambia’s GDP and 18.2% of Guatemala’s.67 India exports agricultural products to the 
tune of $39 billion, while China is the world’s largest exporter of rice.68 Agriculture is the bedrock 
on which the economic boom rests in these two countries.69 Since developing countries have 
witnessed the largest growth in the export of agricultural goods,70 their reliance on this type of 
trade has increased.71 
 
The AoA has different impacts and implications depending on where it is applied and the role a 
particular country plays within the agricultural trade framework. Developing countries have been 
more affected than their developed counterparts. There are various views on the agreement. 
Scholars such as Birovljev and Ćetković argue that it is vitally important as, for the first time it 
formalises agricultural trade and introduces the three important pillars of domestic support, market 
access and export subsidies.72 Jank maintains that the tariff removal increases exports; exports 
                                                          




68 ‘India’s agricultural exports climb record high’ available on http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/india-s-agricultural-
exports-climb-record-high, accessed on 16 August. 
69 ‘Top agricultural producing countries’ available at http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0712/top-
agricultural-producing-countries.aspx, accessed on 17 August 2015. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Birovljev J., Ćetković B., The impact of the WTO agreement on agriculture on food security in developing countries, 
135 EAAE Seminar Challenges for the Global Agricultural Trade Regime after Doha available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/160372/2/03-Birovljev,%20Cetkovic%20-%20EAAE%20135.pdf, accessed 




from Latin America to the EU increased by 8%.73 Other authors note that the fact that domestic 
support is limited improves the ability of farmers in poorer countries that do not have access to 
substantial support to compete with farmers who receive lower subsidies and multinationals in the 
developed world.74 John Jackson argues that lower export subsidies have prevented countries 
flooding the market with their products, promoting competition,75 while Mulleta states that the fact 
that developing countries can deviate and implement smaller tariff reductions works in their favour 
as this ensures that domestic agricultural producers are not threatened by foreign competition.76 
 
However, there are various problems with the implementation of the agreement.  Sharma states 
that many countries lack information on items such as commitments to meet the newly set 
requirements.77 Birovljev and Ćetković are of the opinion that, ‘In developing countries the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture adversely affects food security by increasing poverty and inequality by 
restricting the tools available to governments to promote food security.’78 They add that trade 
liberalisation benefits large industries while the small farmer suffers.79 The current study argues, 
that it advantages richer developed countries like those in the EU and works to the detriment of 
developing countries such as SA.80 One of the most interesting aspects of the AoA which is not 
part of other WTO trade agreements is that subsidies that have the potential to distort trade are 
permitted, despite being limited. This exposes the agreement up to interpretation and manipulation 
                                                          
73 Jank MS., Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: Policies and Implications for Latin America, Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2004.  
74 ‘Agriculture: Fairer trade markets’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm 
accessed, on 18 August 2015. 
75 Jackson J., The Jurisprudence of the GATT and the WTO, Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, 
Cambridge University Press (2000). 
76Mulleta, F.F., The Quest for Affordable Food: Prospects in the Doha Round for Net Food Importing Developing 
Countries, South African Institute of International Affairs: Development Through Trade Program, Occasional Paper 
No. 54. (2010). 
77 Sharma R., Developing Country Experience with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and Negotiating and Policy 
Issues, Paper presented at the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) summer symposium on 
The Developing Countries, Agricultural Trade and the WTO, Whistler Valley, Vancouver, Canada, 16-17 June 2002. 
78 Birovljev J. & Ćetković B., The impact of the WTO agreement on agriculture on food security in developing 
countries, 135 EAAE Seminar Challenges for the Global Agricultural Trade Regime after Doha available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/160372/2/03-Birovljev,%20Cetkovic%20-%20EAAE%20135.pdf, accessed 






which has most often been a claim by nations.81 Furthermore, domestic law will have to be 
amended to successfully implement the AoA. While this will affect all countries, developing 
nations will be most affected.82 Research has also shown that the agreement has resulted in 
increased imports which adversely affect local production in developing countries with major 
impacts on food security as stated by Gonzalez.83 Jackson argues that the non-removal of tariffs in 
the agreement is to the detriment of less developed and developing countries and agriculture still 
remains largely protected.84 These issues are addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
 
This study examines the AoA in detail as its effects are far more than just legislative ones that 
impact trade, but extend to food security and in the long run could potentially affect human rights. 
It discusses how the agreement has impacted SA’s agricultural trade since its inception, especially 
in light of the country being a developing nation. The effect of the AoA’s three pillars on 
agricultural development and SA’s agricultural trade is investigated with particular reference to 
trade with the EU. Given that the commitments for the former are markedly different from those 
for the latter, how does this impact this relationship? Is the agreement skewed in favour of the 
developed world? The AoA’s impact on the relationship between the EU and SA is examined by 
analysing the bilateral Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement85 (TDCA) concluded 
between these parties that is moulded and constrained by the AoA. 
 
The point of entry to this discussion is not from an historical perspective as the deadline for 
implementation has passed but rather from an analysis of whether the agreement has achieved what 
it set out to achieve and its effects from the time of implementation to the present.  This is important 
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as there is talk of new rounds of trade negotiations with some arguing that the agreement might be 
renegotiated with a focus on climate change and food security.86 
 
1.3 Research Question  
The issues addressed in this study are of academic and practical interest for the reasons set below. 
Firstly, considering that this is an agreement which has been assented to by all member states of 
the WTO after negotiations, does the agreement put all states on a level playing field or does it 
have different results on different states? This can be assessed by looking at SA and the EU and 
their relationship. 
Secondly, the question arises as to whether the agreement does more harm than good to SA, 
especially in light of its trade with one its biggest importers, the EU.  
Thirdly, does the AoA work solely to the benefit of the EU as a developed nation, especially in 
relation to the way it trades with developing countries like SA which rely heavily on their trade 
income? 
The main question addressed in this study is thus: Does the AoA have an effect on the trade 
relationship between SA and the EU? 
This can be understood by taking a closer look at the effect of the agreement on South Africa. The 
effect of the agreement on the European Union. And how, if at all, the agreement has it changed 
their relationship? 
 
1.4 Research Methodology  
The study is based on a desktop review of relevant legal and economic material. The legal and 
economic rules, principles, treaties and arguments set out in this material is analysed and critically 
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discussed to draw logical conclusions either to support or reject the proposed topic. Material was 
sourced from online sources, WTO agreements, journal articles, academic papers, academic texts, 
UN and WTO reports and newspaper reports, to name but a few.   
 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
This study is limited to an analysis of the AoA. While the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures87 as well as the Anti-dumping Agreement88 as well as other 
agreements have an effect on the AoA and its implementation, they are not covered in the study. 
Furthermore, the study focuses on the effect of the agreement on two main actors, SA and the EU. 
While other countries may be used for comparative reasons, to highlight a point or as a case study, 
the primary focus is these actors. Nonetheless, the relationship between the EU and SA could be 
regarded as a microcosm of global trade dynamics between developing and developed countries. 
Finally, the study is limited to the current implementation and effect of the agreement, and is based 
on research conducted before June 2016. 
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises the following chapters and parts: 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction and Background 
Chapter 2:  History and Analysis of the WTO and the Agreement on                                          
 Agriculture    
Chapter 2.1:  Part A: History 
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Chapter 2.2:  Part B: The Agreement on Agriculture 
Chapter 3:  The Development of SA’s and the European Union’s Agricultural Trade 
Chapter 3.1:  Part A: The Development of SA’s Agricultural Trade from Apartheid to the
     Democratic Dispensation 
Chapter 3.2:  Part B: The Development of the European Union’s Agricultural Trade 
Chapter 4: The Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement and its Effect on SA 
and the European Union 
Chapter 4.1: Part A: Introduction to the Trade Development Cooperation Agreement 
 between SA and the European Union   
Chapter 4.2:  Part B: Effect of the TDCA on SA and the European Union   




















Agricultural trade has been largely left out of the formal agreements of the multilateral trading 
system (MTS), despite being a central part of this system. In order to answer the research question, 
it is necessary to understand the impact and role of trade in international relations. This chapter 
examines the origins of international trade and the current situation. It focuses on the MLS after 
World War Two (WWII), starting with the Bretton Woods Conference and its outcomes, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).  The International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) is discussed, as well as how its shortcomings led to the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). This thesis is limited in that it will not engage with trade regulations 
prior to the GATT. 
 
Prior to the creation of the GATT, countries traded in a bilateral trade agreement system which 
included the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle discussed later in this chapter.89  The 
economic fallout wrought by WWII created the need for trade transformation and agricultural 
reform, bringing agriculture to the fore of some of the trade negotiations. This is further discussed 
in the section of the various rounds of the GATT and its problems. The need for a global trade 
body gave birth to the WTO. How the AoA became part of the WTO is a key question addressed 
in this chapter. The MFN and the National Treatment Principle (NTP) are still relevant to 
international trade as they have been integrated into the WTO; this issue is also explored.  
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The second part of the chapter analyses the AoA that has changed the face of agricultural trade as 
it introduces regulations for the first time. It focuses on market access, export subsidies and 
domestic support. The effects of three categories of domestic support are further discussed. Finally, 
the de minimus provision is discussed; this is an exemption within the agreement before it outlines 
the country schedules. The effects of such schedules are considered later in the dissertation. 
 
 
2.2 Part A: History 
2.2.1 Introduction Part A 
The 1930s and 1940s were a dark period in world history with the Great Depression and WWII90. 
The end of WWII and the demise of the League of Nations created the need for the international 
community to come together. In 194591 the most powerful international body, the UN, was 
formed.92 Global economic and financial instability in the post-war period93 affected trade and all 
other aspects of international relations. This led to the Bretton Woods Conference.94 
 
2.2.2 The Bretton Woods Conference 
The Bretton Woods Conference, officially known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference, saw 44 delegates from different countries meeting from 1 to 22 July 1944 in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire in the US.95 The conference was the brain child of representatives of 
WWII victors, led by the US and Britain.96 ‘The policies adopted by governments to combat the 
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Great Depression – high tariff barriers, competitive currency devaluations, discriminatory trading 
blocs – had contributed to creating an unstable international environment without improving the 
economic situation.’97 The Atlantic Charter98 issued by US President Roosevelt and British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill was a first small step in seeking to reverse this situation.  The Bretton 
Woods Conference gave birth to the IMF and WB. 
 
2.2.3 The International Monetary Fund 
In 1942, the US and Britain began preparing for formal discussions on economic stability and 
transformation. Harry Dexter White, special assistant to the US Secretary of Treasury and John 
Maynard Keynes, an advisor to the British Treasury wrote separate papers on the formation of an 
organisation that would provide financial assistance to countries facing financial deficits.99 The 
common thread in the proposals was the notion of fixed exchange rates especially in in relation to 
the dollar. From 1942 to spring 1944, considerable effort was put into reaching a common 
approach. On 21 April 1944, the allies announced that an IMF would be formed. The fundamental 
role of the IMF is ‘overseeing the international monetary system to ensure exchange rate stability 
and encouraging members to eliminate exchange restrictions that hinder trade.’100 
Article I of the IMF Charter states that: 
‘The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are: 
i. To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent 
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on 
international monetary problems. 
 
ii. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of 
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employment and real income and to the development of the productive 
resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
 
 
iii. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
 
iv. To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign 
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
 
v. To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments 
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international 
prosperity. 
 
vi. In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members. 
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth in this Article.’101 
The IMF thus aims to maintain economic stability regardless of the political landscape or global 
challenges. It’s aim becomes relevant when trying to assist smaller countries deal with financial 
crisis and assists these and other countries by monitoring exchange rate policies which has a major 
effect on the trade ability of countries.102 It also seeks to address the issue of exchange rates which 
both Keynes and White explored in their proposals.103 
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2.2.4 The World Bank 
The Bretton Woods Conference also saw the formation the WB. The Bank offers loans to 
developing countries that were most in need of funds post-WWII when there was a global 
economic downturn. It is not a traditional bank as such, but has two development arms, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA).104  The WB is collectively owned by 186 members. Recent 
developments include the launch of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) that support the Bank’s goal of reducing poverty worldwide. These five institutions 
constitute the World Bank Group.105 However, loans are conditional on strict repayment policies 
and long-term agreements.106 
 
The IBRD’s Articles of Agreement, Article I: Purposes, state that the aim of the WB is to: 
 
i. ‘Assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the 
investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies 
destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs 
and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less 
developed countries.  
 
ii. Promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and 
other investments made by private investors; and when private capital is not available on 
reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing, on suitable conditions, 
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finance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other 
resources.  
 
iii. Promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of 
equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the 
development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising 
productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labour in their territories.  
 
iv. Arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans through other 




v. Conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business 
conditions in the territories of members and, in the immediate post war years, to assist in 
bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy.’107 
 
 
The Bank is guided in all its decisions by these purposes.108 They illustrate the developmental 
nature of the Bank and its objective of ensuring that developing countries have access to finance.109 
In 2006 the WB gave 48% of total external debt to low and middle income countries, most of 
whom are from the developing world.110 In 2007 the percentage was 43%,in 2008 41% and most 
recently in 2015, 38%.111 This shows that large amount of loans are given to the developing world 
thereby, despite the conditions set by the WB, allowing for developing countries to have funds to 
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function and continue to participate within the trade realm. The WB thus supports the long term 
goals of the Bretton Woods Agreement by making development tools more accessible.112 
 
2.2.5 International Trade Organisation (ITO) 
The WB and the IMF could not achieve economic stability on their own113 The parties to the 
Bretton Woods Conference recognised the need for a structure to set up multilateral trade 
agreements and tariff reductions and to compel states to abide by their commitments, including 
them in their domestic law.114 The formation of the ITO was proposed at the UN Conference on 
Trade and Employment from 21 November 1947 to 24 March 1948 in Havana, Cuba.115 The 
conference produced the Havana Charter which proposed the ITO to address the issues raised 
above. It was signed on 24 March by 53 countries led by the US and Great Britain.116 This was the 
first time so many countries had come together and agreed on trade regulation. The Charter 
provided for a number of escape clauses to the commitments listed in it to cater for the needs of 
the developing countries in Latin America and Asia and the short term needs of the industrial 
world.117 The irony is that, while most of these escape clauses were based on US practices, the 
Charter was not passed by the US Congress.118 
 
It has been argued that the ITO was too ambitious in that it tried to fulfil too many roles and 
overstepped the mark.119  For example, Sir Hubert Henderson stated that its basic conditions were 
unsuited for the modern world.120 He criticised the organisation for failing to include equilibrium 
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in the balance of payments121 and argued that, in negotiating the Charter, the US only supported 
provisions that were in its best interests and wanted to be exempted from the rest.122 Finally, 
Henderson maintained that the economic policy shifts contained in the Charter were too radical 
for a sensitive and insecure financial period.123 
 
The Charter was finally agreed upon in March 1945. However, ratification by the legislatures of 
states proved difficult. Despite being the driving force behind the entire process, the US was unable 
to pass the Charter through its Senate as a result of which the entire process, including the ITO, 
collapsed.124 The US now shifted its focus to the GATT as more and more countries showed 
interest in being part of GATT discussions. The GATT was the only multilateral instrument 
governing international trade from 1948 until the birth of the WTO.125 It is important as it 
formalises international trade and takes a very direct approach to agriculture. The ITO left a gap 
which now the GATT had to fill. 
 
2.2.6 The GATT 
In 1947 certain tariff concessions were negotiated. A mechanism was required to implement and 
protect them and the Havana Charter was still pending entry. Thus, the Chapter on Commercial 
Policy from the Havana Charter was converted to the GATT with a few additions made in the 
process. To bring the GATT into force as quickly as possible a Protocol of Provisional Application 
was developed. This saw the birth of the GATT, one of the most important agreements in trade 
history.126 
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The plan was for the GATT to come into effect immediately and later be amended in line with the 
ITO. This meant that the ITO would replace the GATT.127 Following the failure to form the ITO, 
the GATT was expected to fulfil the ITO’s role, but it was a treaty rather than an organisation and 
was thus unable to do so.128 It was signed on 30 October 1947 and took effect in January 1948.129 
It lasted until 1995 when the WTO came into being. The GATT130 spanned eight rounds of 
negotiations131 each of which had a specific effect on trade with some directly impacting 
agricultural trade. These are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
2.2.6.1 Problems with the GATT 
Leading academic and trade specialist Professor John Jackson identified a number of issues 
relating to the GATT. Firstly, the lack of a Charter meant that the GATT did not have international 
legal personality.132 The agreement was supposed to be provisional until the ITO was established. 
With the collapse of the ITO the GATT remained provisional. Secondly, Jackson states that the 
GATT (Part II of 1947) allowed states to maintain domestic rules even when they consented to the 
GATT. As such, GATT rules only applied when it they were not inconsistent with a state’s 
domestic law. This resulted in a lack of uniformity in the application of the GATT rules which 
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lead to issues in international trade. For example, the GATT did not cater sufficiently for 
agriculture which constituted 12% of world trade or for clothing and textiles that made up 7%.133 
This caused a lack of harmonisation between the GATT and domestic law.134 Nonetheless, the 
GATT played an important role in ensuring the development and operation of international trade 
law such as providing lower tariffs to contracting parties and implementing rules as to how states 
should conduct themselves, and rules on transparency; quotas; tariffs; and economic development 
assistance, etc. 135 It also catered for developing countries by allowing them to exit the 
agreement.136 Of importance was that the GATT made provision for a dispute resolution body and 
set rules for states to join as well as adopting the laws of the GATT. 
 
2.2.7 World Trade Organisation 
In April 1994, 123 countries met in Marrakesh, Morocco to sign the WTO treaty which was to 
change the face of international trade law.137 However the WTO only came into existence on 1 of 
January 1995.138 It is the successor to the GATT139 and incorporates it. GATT 1947 was not legally 
binding and most of its provisions were transferred to GATT 1994 which now forms part of Annex 
1A of the WTO.140 In terms of Article III, ‘The general purpose of the WTO is to facilitate the 
implementation, administration and operation as well as to further the objectives of the WTO 
agreements.’141 The main aim of the WTO is to negotiate multilateral trade agreements to reduce 
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obstacles the international trade and ensure a level playing field.142 These agreements are 
monitored and implemented through the WTO.  
 
‘The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range 
of activities. However, a number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of these 
documents. These principles are the foundation of the multilateral trading system.’143 The principle 
of non-discrimination (discussed later in this chapter) ensures that countries do not discriminate 
between their own and foreign goods. Greater trade openness is encouraged by lowering trade 
barriers as well as quantitative measures and import bans or quotas that selectively restrict 
quantities.144  Predictability and transparency are also core principles. This means there can be no 
sudden and arbitrary changes in trade agreements without proper processes. The WTO also seeks 
to create a more competitive trade environment by discouraging trade barriers such as export 
subsidies and dumping of goods on emerging markets at low rates to gain market dominance. 
Although the issues are complex, the rules try to regulate what is fair and unfair trade. This is 
helpful, especially when governments are directed to put certain measures in place to remedy the 
damage caused by unfair trade. Another principle is more benefits for developing countries 
(discussed above). Finally, a principle that is synonymous with the WTO is protecting the 
environment whilst still being able to trade. The organisation takes steps to protect the environment 
as well as public, animal and plant health145 and enforces this when states conduct national and 
international trade. Ultimately, its core goal is to promote free trade without any damaging side 
effects.146 
 
Somewhat similar to the GATT, the WTO also has a dispute resolution body which addresses with 
disputes arising from interpretation and application of agreements. Given that the GATT lacked 
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uniformity, the WTO seeks to place all states on an equal footing in that they are no longer able to 
pick and choose which agreement they want to be part of. Instead, a package of agreements that 
covers aspects such as trade in goods, services and intellectual property (in a single undertaking). 
These are renegotiated from time to time and added to the package.147 
 
The WTO is run by its members that make all major decisions, either a Ministerial Conference 
that usually takes place once every two years or by their ambassadors or delegates who meet in 
Geneva, the seat of the WTO.148 Unlike the GATT, the WTO compels governments to make their 
trade laws transparent149 as well as their commitments and progress.150 This enables the 
organisation to assess whether or not countries are actively implementing agreements, with 
consequences for defaulters. However, the WTO has a system of substantive equality. Developing 
countries are treated differently and are given longer periods to implement agreements. 
Furthermore, as seen in the AoA, their commitments are less strenuous. Various cooperation 
missions are undertaken in developing nations. The WTO conducts training and capacity building 
programmes for government officials in Geneva each year to enable them to acquire the necessary 
skills to engage with the international trade framework.151 
 
The WTO is led by two main bodies; the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. The 
day-to-day running of the organisation is in the hands of the secretariat in Geneva. The Ministerial 
Conference makes all major decisions with regard to trade. The General Council is more policy 
orientated and consists of the dispute settlement body and the trade review policy body.152 Only 
states may appear before the WTO and no private individuals may make representations.153 Thus 
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in order for a company or individual to have a case heard at the WTO they have to lobby their 
governments to take it up. Unlike the a la carte approach adopted by the GATT where different 
disputes were heard by different bodies, there is one central body.  Space constraints do not allow 
for further discussion of the structure of the WTO. 
 
Two important principles of the WTO are the Most Favoured Nation Principle (MFN) and the 
National Treatment Principle (NTP). Both ensure that market access is not affected by 
discrimination.154 
 
2.2.7.1 Most Favoured Nation Principle 
The MFN is found in Article 1 of the WTO which incorporates part of the GATT, 1994. It states 
that items must be treated the same when they reach a country’s borders, thereby ensuring equality. 
Thus, no matter where the product comes from, all like foreign products will be treated the same; 
this means that if any exceptions are granted to one state, the same exceptions must be granted to 
other states in respect of similar products.155 For example, if The Netherlands were to raise tariffs 
on goods from SA, they would have to raise tariffs on all countries’ products. Changes in the way 
countries are treated apply immediately to all WTO members that the state is in contact with. 
However, the MFN rule is not absolute and there are noted exceptions such as free trade areas, 
customs unions, preferential treatment and the Anti-Dumping156 tariff by WTO members157 that 
are not discussed here. 
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2.2.7.2 National Treatment Principle 
The NTP is found in Article III of the GATT. It follows on from the MFN principle but provides 
that once a product has met the requirements to enter a country, it must be treated the same as that 
country’s domestic goods.158 Thus, foreign and domestic goods must be treated exactly the same 
within WTO member states.159 This provision is open to interpretation and cases have been used 
to interpret what it means. A case that is often used is the Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Case160  
that offers guiding principles on interpretation.161 ‘However, two policies are specifically exempt 
from NT obligations, i) subsidies - government schemes that grant benefits to specific entities and 
ii) government procurement - government entities purchasing goods with no intention of reselling 
them.’162 
 
2.2.8 Agricultural Trade negotiations during the GATT rounds  
During the various rounds of negotiations from the 1940s to the present, there have been substantial 
changes in the approach to agricultural trade and much focus has been placed on this sector. 
Previous documents such as the Havana Charter focused more on labour law than trade.163 
However, agriculture did come up in the GATT rounds which will be briefly discussed below. The 
first three rounds primarily focused on liberating the manufacturing industry which meant that 
agriculture was left to domestic control and regulation.164 
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The Geneva round which began in April 1947165 lasted seven months and saw the signing of the 
GATT. It focused on tariff reductions through the Supplier Rule. On request, this allows special 
tariff concessions for the country that supplies the largest amount of a particular product.166 The 
most notable aspect of this round was the number of concessions granted. Although the exact 
number is not known it is said that about 45 000 concessions occurred during this round, affecting 
approximately $10 billion worth of trade.167 
 
The Annecy Round in Annecy, France began in 1949 and lasted five months. Once again, the focus 
was on tariff reduction but it also allowed the accession of more members.168 
 
England was the host of the eight-month Torquay round which began in September 1950.169 
Thirty-eight countries participated and 8 700 tariff concessions were reached.170 
 
The second Geneva round occurred from 1956 to 1959 in Geneva.171  $2.5 billion worth of trade 
concessions were agreed and it was during this round that the European Economic Community 
(EEC) formed the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1957.172 The CAP aimed to protect the 
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EEC’s domestic agricultural industry through the use of farm subsidies which promoted its 
agricultural products together with the use of tariffs.173 
 
Former US Treasury Secretary, Douglas Dillon, proposed the next round of negotiations which 
came to be known as the Dillon round of negotiations that took place in Geneva and began in 
September 1960. 174 Despite the US originally arguing for the banning of the CAP, it eventually 
accepted it.175 This round witnessed an estimated $4.9 Billion worth of trade concessions. 
 
Round 6 began in Geneva in May, 1963. Proposed by US President John F. Kennedy, it came to 
be known as the Kennedy round. Agriculture and farm subsidies were ignored in this round of 
negotiations.176 
 
The 7th round occurred from 1973 to 1979 in Tokyo and saw the largest number of participants 
since the GATT’s inception, with 102 nations participating. More than 8 700 concessions were 
approved. For the first time, members agreed that agriculture should receive the same attention as 
other sectors. This saw a massive change in agricultural trade which was spurred on by the US 
proposing a set of agricultural trade reforms from non-tariff barriers to tariff-equivalents.177 ‘The 
EU argued against such major trade reform in agriculture in order to defend its CAP. In the end, 
the EU won on a procedural vote. This meant that the CAP was safe until the next round of GATT 
negotiations.’178 
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The final round of GATT negotiations was the Uruguay Round which started in 1986 and ended 
in 1994. 179 This saw an increase of agricultural negotiations as well as the number of 
participants.180 The long life span of this round means that it is not possible to cover in depth here; 
the key outcomes are, however, considered. This round saw the formulation of the AoA which 
focused on the three areas on which agricultural trade systems are based.181 
 
Interestingly, the US and the Cairns Group argued for greater agricultural reform during these 
rounds with the latter in particular arguing for improved market access and reduced domestic 
support.182 The EU argued against this and stated that the GATT should be more in line with its 
CAP. It also suggested individual commodity reform rather than a holistic approach. This was 
supported by the Japanese and Koreans who had vested interests due to their large volumes of rice 
exports. Developing countries argued for special and differential treatment and hoped for greater 
market access. 
 
A key document during this round was the Dunkel Draft which was formulated after negotiations 
deadlocked during the 1988 mid-term review. A number of short term measures were introduced 
in the Geneva Accord of April 1989, including a freeze on domestic support, border protection and 
export subsidies.183 Negotiations continued and in 1990 the EU again rejected the draft agreement. 
Finally, in 1991 all countries agreed to liberalise three key areas of international agricultural 
trade.184 At the last minute, the EU rejected the Dunkel Draft stating that it should be re-negotiated. 
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To the surprise of many, the following year the EU started revisiting its CAP to bring it closer in 
line with the Dunkel Draft, resulting in the Blair House Accord. 
 
The key goal of the Blair House Accord was to amend the Dunkel Draft. These amendments, which 
are now in the Final Agreement, included the following: 
 
 ‘the volume of subsidized exports be reduced to 21 per cent from the original proposal of 
24 per cent; the base period used for establishing the baseline from which export subsidies 
would be cut was made more flexible, and had the effect of initially raising the level of 
permitted export subsidies; direct income payments made under production limiting 
programmes such as EU’s scheme under the reformed CAP and the USA’s deficiency 
payments were made exempt from domestic support reduction commitments; and 
commitments to reduce domestic support on a product-by-product basis were replaced by 
a commitment to reduce overall support to the agricultural sector.’185 
 
The Blair House Accord saw the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1993 with all parties reaching 
agreement.186 ‘The AoA became an annexure to the main agreement establishing the WTO. After 
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2.2.9 Agriculture under the WTO  
Article 20 of the AoA188 highlights the importance of agricultural trade and that on-going 
negotiations are required for agricultural liberalisation to occur.189 
 
2.2.9.1 Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference, 1996 
The first ministerial conference took place in Singapore in 1996190. It focused on four main issues: 
government procurement; trade facilitation; trade and investment and trade and competition.191 
Developing countries argued during negotiations that these issues favoured developed countries. 
 
2.2.9.2 Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference, 1999192 
Due to the fact that developing nations felt that the Singapore issues favoured the developed world, 
the negotiations at this conference collapsed.193 
 
2.2.9.3 GATT Doha Round, 2001 
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In 2000, an Agricultural Committee was established to head up the Doha round of negotiations.194 
Of interest is that 45 interested countries made proposals to the committee and these were 
negotiated to reach common ground. These issues were discussed at the Ministerial Conference in 
Doha, Qatar in 2001.  The AoA identified agricultural reforms in three main areas: i) improve 
market access to developed countries, ii) reduce domestic support and iii) reduce farm subsidies. 
The Doha negotiations have therefore centered on these areas.195 The round is yet to be completed. 
 
2.2.9.4 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference, 2003 
Various submissions were made, with some countries making individual submissions and others 
combined ones. The US and EU teamed up and other partnerships emerged. This saw countries 
like SA, Brazil, China and other developing nations coming together. They formed the group that 
came to be known as the G20 countries.196 The Cancun round resulted in a deadlock; a not 
uncommon situation within the WTO and the MTS.  The deadlock broke in July 2007 and the 
modalities in agriculture were established through a package of agreements called the July package 
or the “August Framework” as it is officially known.197 
 
2.2.9.5 Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference, 2005 
At this conference members decided to set a scale of reduction in agricultural tariffs and on farm 
subsidies.198 However, no agreement was reached and a deadline to do so was set. 
 
2.2.9.6 Negotiations from 2006 to 2008 
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In July 2006, another deadlock was reached and attempts were made to break it in 2007. 199 After 
a series of meetings in Geneva a draft on modalities was finally produced. This became known as 
the ‘July 2008 package.’200 The next step was a ministerial conference.201 
 
2.2.9.7 Geneva WTO Ministerial Conference, 2009 
This round started on 30 November and ended on 2 December 2009. The theme was ‘The WTO, 
the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment.’202 Director-
General, Mr Pascal Lamy noted that the main reason for this round was to review the WTO’s 
performance in addressing the major issues confronting international trade.203 The deadline for this 
round was 2010. 
 
2.2.9.8 Geneva WTO Ministerial Conference, 2011 
At this point the members agreed that the draft modalities of 2008 should remain the basis for 
future agricultural negotiations. Despite this, Mr Lamy has suggested that the Doha round is 
effectively dead.204 
 
2.2.9.9 Bali WTO Ministerial Conference, 2013 
Bali was the host of the 9th Ministerial conference that focused on reaching agreement on specific 
issues. It placed much emphasis on agriculture and its specifics are discussed later on in the 
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thesis.205 Some of the outcomes of the Bali round included a ministerial declaration which 
reaffirmed the principles and objectives of the Marrakesh Agreement which established the 
WTO.206 The conference also focused on the Doha Development Agenda as well and delved 
further into the agenda.207 
 
2.2.9.10 Nairobi Ministerial Conference, 2015 
The Nairobi conference208 saw the adoption Nairobi package together with a group of Ministerial 
decisions on agriculture, cotton and issues related to LDC’s.209 The Nairobi declaration confirms 
the commitment of WTO members to continue and advance negotiations on the Doha issues. These 
issues include all three pillars of agriculture as outlined in the AoA.210 There has also been some 
developments surrounding export subsidies of developing nations and the elimination of such 
subsidies with immediate effect.211 Further, new rules regarding cotton export were also 
introduced.212 ‘The implementation of preferential treatment in favour of services and service 
suppliers of Least Developed Countries and increasing LDC Participation in services extend the 
multilateral waiver for preferences to LDC services exports to 2030 was introduced.’213 
 
2.2.10 Conclusion  
Part A of this chapter traced the changes to the MTS, focusing on agriculture. While most argue 
that these are positive, some view them in a negative light. It showed how agriculture shifted from 
domestic jurisdiction as the GATT continued to change. The Uruguay round saw the introduction 
of the all-important AoA which focused on market access, domestic support and export subsidies. 
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The AoA allows for continued negotiations on these matters. Thus, the Doha rounds continue and 
trade reform in the agricultural sector is an on-going process. It is claimed that these negotiations 
witnessed the progressive realisation of trade liberalisation. While the main engagements largely 
omitted agriculture, as the focus changed, it was realised that there is a need to regulate this 
important sector. As the rounds progressed agriculture took center stage but, due to states’ vested 
interests in amongst other things, agricultural and economic growth, the talks collapsed. They were 
resuscitated by key members from the USA and Europe and after various rounds where different 
categories of countries presented their views, the AoA was finally agreed upon, changing 



















2.3 Part B: The Agreement on Agriculture 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This part of the chapter briefly discusses the three main pillars of the AoA, market access, export 
subsidies and domestic support. 
 
2.3.2 Market Access 
The AoA states: ‘Article 4:  
 
1. Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions of 
tariffs, and to other market access commitments as specified therein.  
 
2. Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have 
been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, except as otherwise provided 
for in Article 5 and Annex 5.’214 
 
There are four important elements of market access:  
 
1. ‘Tariffication - the obligation to convert non-tariff-barriers (NTBs) to trade tariff 
equivalents. 
 
2. Tariff reduction. 
 
3. Market access provisions that require countries to provide "low" import tariffs for a fixed 
quota of imports. 
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4. Special treatment and special safeguard provisions that provide exemptions from the above 
commitments.’215 
 
These measures have various critical effects on trade, including opening the market to make trade 
more friendly and preventing countries from using trade barriers to their advantage by distorting 
trade restrictions. They promote the development of trade by ensuring that existing export markets 
are maintained and that countries are allowed stipulated volumes of imports at reduced tariffs. ‘A 
WTO Member is no longer allowed to limit trade through import bans or quantitative restrictions, 
or other similar measures, except under such specified situations such as safeguards, food safety 
and adverse balance of payment situation.’216 
 
Article 4.2217 does not allow quantitative restrictions on imports and thus only normal tariffs 
apply.218 This works to the benefit of most developing nations, who rely on exports and whose 
ability to import is hindered by import quotas mostly set by developed countries that desire to 
control their domestic markets.  A classic example is the export of grapes from Namibia to the EU. 
Due to “miserly” import quotas, Namibia is only able to import 900 tonnes of seedless grapes to 
the EU and amount above this has a 16.4% tariff charge.219 This is but one of many examples 
where the quota is detrimental; the agreement seeks to change this situation. 
 
The importance of the base-period, from 1986 to 1988 cannot be overemphasised, since, having 
established the value of the base period tariff through the tariffication of NTBs countries are 
committed to reducing these as follows: 
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i. For developed countries, an unweighted average of 36% subject to a minimum reduction 
of 15% in each tariff line over a six-year implementation period. 
 
ii. For developing countries the commitments are 24% and 10%, respectively and the 
implementation period is extended to ten years. 
 
iii. There are no reduction commitments for LDCs.220 
 
2.3.3 Export Subsidies 
Article 9 of the AoA221 discusses export subsidies. It states that these must be reduced and that 
such reductions are commitments under the agreement.222 Article 9 states that export subsidy 
reduction must occur for the following: 
 
9.1(a) - Governments or their agencies that are directly subsidising exports.223 
 
9.1(b) - The selling of or disposing of non-commercial stocks of agriculture, by 
government, via export at a rate that is lower than that which the goods can be acquired 
within the domestic market.224 
 
9.1(c) - ‘payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
governmental action.’225 
 
9.1(d) - ‘the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural 
products.’226 
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9.1(e) - ‘internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated 
by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments.’227 
 
9.1(f) - ‘subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported 
products.’228 
 
Woolcock and Sykes state that export subsidies are the most important aspect of the AoA as they 
have the most immediate and direct impact on world markets.229  An export subsidy refers to state 
support for producers that have a surplus. This enables them to export their goods to the global 
market at a cheaper rate.230  Agriculture receives preferential treatment as such export subsidies 
are not permitted in other sectors; the agreement introduced constraints where none previously 
existed but still allowed them to exist.231 Sykes noted that, ‘If a particular program confers benefits 
on a private entity, a ‘subsidy’ may be declared to exist without further enquiry.’232 This is 
pertinent as the definition of a subsidy is often manipulated to escape the restrictions placed by the 
agreement. Therefore it is essential to understand exactly what a subsidy is. 
 
The essence of the restriction is as follows: ‘Export subsidies, measured in terms of both 
the volume of subsidised exports, and in terms of the budgetary expenditure on subsidies, have 
been capped at base period levels. A list of 22 products has been defined to which Countries are 
now committed to reducing export subsidies for a large number of different agricultural 
commodities.233  Items on the list include rice, coarse grains, wheat and wheat flour, sugar, butter 
and butter oil, bovine pig and poultry meat, wine, tobacco and cotton, etc. The schedule for 
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implementing cuts appears in the Country Schedules.234 ‘The base period specifies the level of the 
subsidy for each affected commodity; the bound level for 1995 and the level to which the subsidy 
will be reduced to by the end of the implementation period.’235  
 
The data show that developed countries appeared to be committed to reducing the volume of 
subsidised exports by 21% and expenditure on subsidies by 36%, both over a six-year 
implementation period (1995-2000).236 For developing countries the reduction commitments were 
14% and 24% for volume and expenditure, respectively, whilst the implementation period (1995-
2004) was ten rather than six years.237 The base period for export subsidies differs from that of 
market access as here the base period is 1986 to 1990.238 No reduction is required for LDCs. 
Furthermore 9.1(d) and (e) are permissible in these countries. 239 ‘The rules do not say anything 
about per unit subsidy rates in any year240 - which may mean that the rates may be varied provided 
that the maximum limits on both the outlay and volume are respected. Some flexibility is provided 
by Article 9.2(b); in that in any year a country can exceed, within limits, the prescribed level of 
subsidy provided specified cumulative criteria are met.’241 However the interpretation of such 
flexibility causes confusion. 
 
Article 10 of the Agreement242 - prevention of circumvention of export subsidy commitments - 
looks at how members can hide their subsidies under other mechanisms. ‘Export credits provide 
one such possibility, the concern here being that they may conceal an element of price or interest 
rate subsidy.’243 Article 10.2 calls for members to work towards international measures to govern 
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these provisions and Article 10.4 deals with food aid and stipulates that it should not be used to 
circumvent export subsidy reduction commitments. Many developed countries have successfully 
implemented the export subsidy reduction with the United States, Finland, Sweden, Canada and 
the European Union reaching their 36% reduction target. Developing countries like Romania and 
Israel also have met their 24% reduction target.244 
 
The fundamental reason why export subsidies were introduced is because it causes a lot of damage 
to exporting countries and reduces their market shares and export earnings. This mostly affects 
developing countries such as countries within the Cairns Group and on the African continent.245 
‘In general, export subsidies may offer overall welfare gains to importing countries with very low 
levels of self-sufficiency, as consumer gains should more than often offset producer losses, 
although the extent to which such subsidies destabilise markets influences this calculation.’246 
Among other reasons, this explains why the export subsidies are critical to bring about trade 
balance and to ensure that countries are not disadvantaged based on their economic situation and 
clout. Rather, countries with significant agricultural potential can benefit from trade in such 
goods.247 
 
2.3.4 Domestic Support 
The main goal of domestic support is to raise the income of the producer and maintain the 
profitability of domestic farming. As the name suggests, governments offer financial support to 
domestic farmers or companies, thereby decreasing production costs and increasing profitability. 
Goods can be sold at low prices, and can thus flood the market and cause market domination.248 
‘The agricultural package of the Uruguay Round has fundamentally changed the way domestic 
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support in favour of agricultural producers was treated under the GATT 1947.’249 The agreement 
only allows for unrestricted domestic support in two situations and restricts it under one situation. 
As highlighted in chapter 1, these categories are the Green, Blue and Amber boxes. 
 
2.3.4.1 Green Box 
Annex 2 of the AoA250 sets out the criteria that must be met for the support to fall under the Green 
Box and therefore be exempted from reduction commitments. This means that support can even 
be increased without any financial limitation by the WTO.251 The general criteria set in annex 2 
are that the support should have ‘no or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production.’252 It must be provided through a publicly-funded government programme which does 
not involve transfers from consumers and must not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers.253 The Green Box covers government service programmes and was mainly created for 
the benefit of developing nations. This includes programmes that involve research on the 
environment and the product. 
 
‘The Green Box also provides for the use of direct payments to producers which are not linked to 
production decisions, i.e. although the farmer receives a payment from the government, this 
payment does not influence the type or volume of agricultural production (‘decoupling’).’254 
 
2.3.4.2 Blue Box 
Unlike with the Green Box, where support is not determined by action, with the Blue Box support 
is actionable in return for production; thus, the quantity has no consequential effect on the 
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support.255 Direct payments under production limiting programmes (often referred to as “Blue 
Box” measures) are exempt from commitments if such payments are made on fixed areas and yield 
a fixed number of livestock.256 ‘Such payments also fit into this category if they are made on 85 
per cent or less of production in a defined base period.’257 
 
2.3.4.3 Amber Box 
The Amber Box contains all domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade 
(with some exceptions), which is defined in Article 6 of the Agreement.258 These include measures 
to support prices, or subsidies directly related to production quantities. These supports are subject 
to limits, de minimis exemptions.259 ‘The ‘amber box’, also known as the ‘Aggregate Measure of 
Support’ (AMS), combines price support with aid coupled to production and not exempt from 
reduction commitments. This had to be reduced by 20% over six years, compared with the 
reference period 1986-1988. In addition, all WTO members may apply the ‘de minimis clause’, 
which allows any support amounting to less than 5% of the value of the product under 
consideration (specific aid) or of total agricultural production (non-specific aid) to be excluded 
from the current AMS. This ceiling is set at 10% for developing countries.’260 
 
 
This category is often exploited by developed nations. Most subsidies in these countries go to a 
small group of agri-businesses that are then able to dominate the global market. Because this is 
allowed by the agreement it is continuously done on a large scale despite the reduction. While 
developed nations have the funds to do so, developing nations do not and it has a completely 
different effect on them. The developed nations enjoy economic growth and domination, while 
developed nations suffer reliance and economic stagnation. This violates the very reason for the 
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existence of the WTO. Developed countries have not sufficiently decreased their trade-distorting 
agricultural subsidies, which provide additional income to agricultural producers and allow them 
to sell their products at a lower price.261 Farmers in developing countries are forced to compete 
with subsidised, larger foreign producers who may cause local producers to go out of business, 
increasing rural-urban migration, the vulnerability of food-importing nations to swings in global 
commodity markets, and food insecurity.262 
 
An example is the large subsidies, amounting to more than $ 1.25 billion dollars granted to the 
cotton industry in the USA263 which, due to excess production, causes them to sell their product at 
a lower price. Farmers in poor African countries, where there is no subsidy, are forced to sell at 
this new low price to survive in a market that is dominated by US producers. As their survival is 
at stake, they take what they get and incur a $450 million loss in the process.264 The narrative is 
repeated in the EU’s support of the beef industry with each cow receiving US$ 2.2 support per 
day, more than what half the world’s population earns a day.265 Once again, this works to the 
detriment of producers in the developing world as goods are dumped on the global market, causing 
major imbalances in global trade dynamics. 
 
2.3.5 De Minimis Provision 
As noted earlier, certain subsidies in the Amber Box are exempted and are called the de minimis 
provisions. If a product does not fall under the blue or green categories, it is subject to reduction. 
However, if total domestic support is not more than 5% of the total value of production for that 
product in developed countries and 10% in developing countries, it is not subject to reduction. For 
example, if the value of the production of sugar is $100 million and the domestic support offered 
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is $5 million, it is not subject to domestic support reductions.266 Non-product specific support it is 
not subject to reduction if the support is 5% (developed countries) and 10% (developing countries) 
of the value of total agricultural production.267 
 
2.3.6 Country Schedules 
The AoA was not the only document to come out of the Uruguay round. The round as a whole 
required certain quantitative commitments (which were a key part of the round). Countries had to 
outline their commitments on a commodity to commodity basis in country schedules and submit 
them to the WTO.268 Countries presented their drafts that were then open for other countries to 
evaluate and object to the schedules. Known as the verification process, it lasted which lasted from 
December 1993 to April 1994. If no country objected to another country’s schedules by the end of 
the Uruguay round on 15 April 1994, it formed part of the final schedules.269 Only a few 
adjustments and negotiations occurred. These final schedules signify a country’s commitment to 
the WTO and are thus considered to have international legal status.270 The commitments in the 
schedules usually have to be implemented within a particular period as outlined in specific 
agreements on particular commodities. Once these tariffs were finalized they became binding. The 
commitments are highlighted per commodity and in this case NTBs, export subsidies and domestic 
support are highly applicable with regards to agriculture.271 
 
2.3.7 Conclusion 
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An analysis of the AoA illustrates the extent to which agriculture has become regulated. This issue 
is discussed in more detail when this agreement and its effects on the EU and SA are considered. 
The differential treatment of countries based on their development status shows the steps the WTO 
has taken in seeking to level the playing field. Whether or not this has been achieved will also be 
analysed. While the measures put in place might be regarded as benefitting developing countries, 
in reality, they often allow them to be exploited by developed nations. Country schedules bind 
countries to their commitments. The three aspects of the AoA render agricultural trade more stable 
to a certain degree but more importantly, make this trade a real and significant part of the global 
trading system. However, the agreement however is extremely technical and requires a fair amount 
of expertise to understand and implement correctly. This is not always easy for developing 
countries. While it treats all likes the same, which prevents global trade discrimination, in some 






















While SA is well known for its troubled political and socio-economic history, its political and 
social transformation is admired worldwide and has had major effects on its trade and industry. 
Various trade developments emerged as the political situation changed. New political ideologies, 
the need to redress the atrocities and inequalities of the past and the development of a more 
nuanced approach to socio-economic rights and trade development marked SA’s transition to 
democracy. The first part of this chapter assesses political change in SA in the past 70 years. 
However, the focus’ is trade in the post-apartheid dispensation. It is vital to understand the political 
shift in order to analyse how the political ideologies of the new government changed and moulded 
new trade policies. The chapter investigates how the South African Constitution272 has impacted 
on international law and trade law in specific. It focuses on changes in international trade post 
1994. It examines current trade policies and how they operate between members of the agreements. 
Current legislation that relates to trade as well as bilateral and multilateral international trade 
agreements is examined. Finally, the chapter summarises other trade agreements that are important 
in understanding the context in which the AoA and others operate as well as how the TDCA is 
impacted by trade developments within the Republic.  
 
Part B of this chapter focuses on the EU. It briefly outlines its emergence and history as well as its 
functionality. Finally, it considers the current EU position on agricultural policy which is necessary 
to understand how the common agricultural policy informs external EU trade policies, including 
the TDCA.  
 
                                                          




3.2 Part A: South Africa’s Trade Development from Apartheid to the Democratic 
Dispensation 
 
3.2.1 SA’s Political History and Transition 
Apartheid came into being when the National Party assumed power in SA in 1948. This system of 
racial segregation privileged whites273 and forcibly imposed residential segregation and separate 
public areas for white and Black South Africans. Marriage between people from different race 
groups was outlawed by the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act274 and all political opposition was 
supressed. 
 
One of the first pieces of legislation passed by this new government was the Export Credit and 
Foreign Investments Insurance Act.275 It provided insurance on contracts for export transactions 
and investment loans with countries outside the Republic in order to promote trade.276 Although 
still applicable today the Act was largely ineffective during the period of economic sanctions.277 
 
The apartheid regime imposed its will by means of brute force and its police force that was accused 
of and later admitted278 to committing acts of violence and murder to further the interests of the 
government. The regime violated various international treaties and human rights law.279 Given that 
SA depends on trade in gold and other natural resources, its trade policy focused on this sector. 
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The African National Congress (ANC) and other movements such as the Pan Africanist Movement 
(PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) that led the struggle against apartheid280  
were banned for many years, with many of their members being forced to flee the country, while 
others were tortured, murdered and incarcerated for long periods of time.  Many African countries 
as well as in other parts of the world supported the anti-apartheid struggle. When the ANC came 
to power, it sought to repay its debts to these countries, providing loans and other kinds of support 
and, in particular, strengthening ties with Southern African countries. Various treaties were signed 
between the states in this sub-region; these are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The massacre of 69 people protesting against SA’s pass laws at Sharpeville in 21 June 1960281 not 
only kicked off the armed struggle but brought further international attention to the atrocities in 
the country.282 The Soweto uprising in 1976 further underlined to extent to which the National 
Party was prepared to use violent means to suppress any opposition. The UN demanded an end to 
apartheid and was met with militant refusal by the government and the then president Verwoerd.283 
On 1 April 1960 the UN Security Council passed resolution 134284 deploring apartheid policies 
and Sharpeville killings. In 1962, it adopted resolution 1761285 against apartheid policies. The 
General Assembly highlighted SA’s blatant disrespect for the UN in ignoring warnings and 
requests to abandon its racial policies.286 The resolution went on to urge UN members to end all 
diplomatic ties with SA and to close their ports to ships which flew the South African flag.287 The 
most damaging part of the resolution was section 4(d)288 which promoted a boycott of South 
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African goods and refraining from exporting goods and ammunition to the country. This had a 
direct effect on the South African economy. The value of the currency dropped and trade input and 
output plummeted to all-time lows.289 
 
Over the years, various resolutions were passed urging States to stop dealing with SA.  An Arms 
Embargo was also passed in the 1970s290 which increased the pressure. In 1985 some 30 
multinational companies began divesting from SA.291 Foreign capital was diverted to other 
countries.292 However during the 1970s, trade policy shifted to import substitution with the aim of 
diversifying economic activity, enhancing growth and making SA less reliable on trade in gold 
and mineral resources.   A report published by the IMF in the early 1990s showed the impact of 
the sanctions. White employment decreased293 which meant that the system the white minority had 
rooted for was no longer working for them. Former President De Klerk recounts how isolated 
white South Africans felt when they travelled abroad and how difficult it was to run a country with 
so many restrictions.294 He adds that financial difficulties became a “source of social unrest.”295 
International isolation negatively impacted trade 
 
However not all countries saw the apartheid regime for what it was. Britain and some of the other 
former colonial powers did not want to cut ties with SA as it was regarded as the gateway to the 
continent.296 Indeed, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher referred to the ANC as a ‘terrorist’ 
organisation.297 Under her administration, British companies were allowed to trade with SA and 
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were SA’s biggest trade partners. While the United Kingdom later imposed sanctions on SA by 
Britain, this was the result of the US Congress’ decision to take this route, as Thatcher feared that 
failure to do so would result in her country’s global isolation.298 
 
Countries all over the world countries continued to dissociate themselves from SA and the rand 
plummeted to all-time lows.299 The country’s virtual bankruptcy forced the National Party to the 
negotiations table. De Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990 and the ANC and other 
organisations were unbanned. The two leaders guided SA to a democratic election despite fears of 
an uprising by various groups. The ANC won the elections with an overwhelming majority and 
SA became a free and democratic country.300 Sanctions were lifted and SA was welcomed back 
into the international community. It soon became a key trading partner not only within the Southern 
African region but in the global multilateral trading system.301 However, the democratic 
government inherited a complex system of quantitative restrictions and high tariffs302 on consumer 
products, with lower tariffs on imported machinery and capital goods.303 . The ANC’s focus on 
regional integration and economic transformation had a direct impact on its trade policy. The 
ANC’s economic policies were based on the Freedom Charter.304 The democratic government’s 
trade policies rested on four pillars: sustainable and environmentally- friendly economic growth; 
investment that promotes job creation; economic integration into the Southern African region and 
a clear and effective competition policy to promote fairness in the market for domestic and 
international goods.305 This stance was completely different to from taken by the apartheid regime 
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that steered clear of regional integration and focused on relationships with the former colonial 
powers. 
 
3.2.2 The South African Constitution and Trade 
The founding document of the democratic dispensation, the South African Constitution306 
privileges human rights and the rule of law. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land.307  Its 
Bill of Rights (BOR) sets out important rights which are the cornerstone of the country’s 
democracy. While it does not directly address international trade, some sections are of interest. 
Interestingly, the TDCA, which encompasses trade, development, good governance and 
cooperation, embraces certain constitutional provisions/elements. For example, S22308 of the BOR 
states that citizens have freedom of trade and occupation. This makes it necessary for the 
government to enact legislation that enables trade of all kinds, including international trade. It can 
therefore be assumed that citizens’ right to trade is protected in the Constitution. The more 
controversial property clause in S25 of the Constitution allows for property to be expropriated and 
fairly redistributed.309 Those whose land was unfairly appropriated during the apartheid period are 
now able reclaim their land and contribute to the economy through agricultural development and 
production.310 This effectively enables the poor to participate in international trade as SA is known 
for its agricultural exports.311 
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S39 (1) (b) of the BOR312 states that, in interpreting the BOR the courts must consider international 
law. Furthermore, S232 states that international customary law becomes law in SA unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of parliament.313 Finally, S231 provides that an 
international agreement is only binding on the state once it has passed through both houses of 
parliament.314 It then becomes law in the Republic. The courts must interpret legislation consistent 
with international law (S233).315 Thus, international law is highly respected in the South African 
legal system; this opened the door for SA to enter into more international agreements, such as the 
TDCA and WTO trade agreements.316 
 
Treaty law is directly applicable to the South African legal system.317 With the development of a 
constitutional order, for the first time, the implementation of treaties was binding on all arms of 
the state. This meant that international trade law and trade agreements became binding; these have 
played a significant role in SA’s development. All three arms of the state, the executive, the 
legislature and judiciary, are bound by these treaties, unlike the previous government where 
parliament was supreme. Legal opinions and policy decisions of the international organisations 
like the WTO and WB are respected by States and are persuasive in nature but are not binding. 
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3.2.3 Post-1994 Trade Developments 
As noted earlier, with the lifting of the arms embargo and economic sanctions during the period 
1990 to 1994, SA entered a new trade era. This required major policy shifts that yielded positive 
results; in the first 10 years of democracy the country achieved a growth rate of 3%; significantly 
higher than the 10 years prior to 1994 when it was only 1%.318 From 2004 the growth rate exceeded 
4% per annum, with 5% recorded in 2005. However, the 2008 global economic crisis severely 
affected the South African economy.319 In 1994 SA signed the Marrakesh agreement under the 
Uruguay round of the GATT and therefore became a founding member of the WTO.320 This meant 
that it had to commit to significant trade liberalisation. The Agreement was ratified by parliament 
in March 1995.321 The schedule of specific commitments made by SA on financial services under 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was ratified by both houses of parliament in 
1999 and therefore became binding on SA.322 The country made more than 12 000 tariff 
concessions and quantitative restrictions on agriculture were converted to tariff equivalents.323 Bell 
concludes that SA has actually exceeded its commitments under the GATT. 324 Lawrence Edwards 
notes that effective rates of protection for trade fell from the 1990s to 2004.325 In the manufacturing 
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∗ is the domestic value added to the final product j at tariff distorted prices, 𝑉𝑗 is the value added under free 
trade, 𝑡𝑗 is the tariff on outputs, 𝑡𝑖 is the tariff on inputs and 𝑎𝑖𝑗  is the quantity of the intermediate input 𝑖 used in the 




sector, it fell from 48% in 1993 to 12.7% in 2004, while surcharges dropped from 30.8% to 8% 
between 1993 and 2003.326 In 1994 the labour intensive manufacturing sectors such as textiles, 
leather products and furniture were given the highest protection, while the primary sector which 
included agriculture and mining had negative or low rates of protection.327 The WB recently stated 
that it is easier to do business in SA than in other BRICS328 countries; however, in trading across 
borders, South African firms are disadvantaged than other BRICS countries’ firms, except for 
Russian firms.329 The table below presents a summary of trade transformation from the 1970s to 
the post-apartheid era. 
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Table 1: Chronology of trade liberalisation from the early 1970s 
Source: Bell (1992, 1997), Belli et al. (1993), WTO (1993, 1998, 2003) 330 
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This table shows the major changes in SA’s international trade. 
 
3.2.4 Acts of Parliament 
In 2002, SA passed the International Trade Administration Act to regulate trade.331 The Act created 
the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) which came into force on the 1 June 
2003.332 It replaced the Board of Tariffs and Trade which existed from 1986.333 The ITAC is a 
statutory body that aims to increase investment and thus create jobs through economic expansion 
and development. It was also tasked with the responsibility of establishing an efficient and 
effective system for the administration of international trade in line with the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU)334 Agreement and the International Trade Administration Act.335 The 
main functions of ITAC are customs tariff investigations, import and export control and trade 
remedies.336 It is a key component in ensuring that SA’s international trade is not only on par with 
the rest of the world but does not fall behind in terms of policies and regulations which may make 
subject to abuse. The ITAC investigates imports and exports as well as tariffs and prepares reports 
which it uses to draft and suggest policy and regulations to government.337 Most tariff adjustments 
are done under the Schedules of the Excise and Customs Act338 which is still applicable. 
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The ITAC is guided (and in some instances bound) by and works closely with other policies and 
legislation. The New Growth Path339 is one such policy. It strives to achieve an annual growth rate 
of between 6% and 7% per annum and to create five million jobs by 2020340; international trade is 
crucial in achieving these objectives. Another is the Industrial Policy Action Plan (Ipap), first 
introduced in 2007 and amended and reintroduced in 2013 with Ipap 5 coming into being in 
2015.341 This plan aims to reduce unemployment and spur growth. Trade and Industry Minister, 
Mr Rob Davies has described Ipap as a policy that addresses the need for long term development 
through exports, amongst other things. The policy also explored new export markets especially in 
BRICS nations.342 Other policies include the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF)343 and 
the Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (TPSF).344 
 
The TPSF is a critical policy for SA, especially when it comes to agricultural trade and production. 
The agricultural sector will be subject to tariffs that must be in line with SA’s international 
commitments and will be applied on a case to case basis. Trade distortion by the country’s trading 
partners is also alluded to in the policy and it makes provision for such distortion to be investigated, 
thus ensuring that SA remains a competitive agricultural exporter. The policy also notes the need 
to weigh up the profitability of farmers against the price of food and the need to ensure food 
security among the poor.345 It makes direct reference to the ITAC and informs its functioning. It 
goes onto consider various regional and international bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
as well as how SA can expand into the global economy.346 Finally, the policy considers preferential 
trade agreements (PTA) as well as free trade areas (FTA) and their implementation and 
development. Dube and Mandigora argue that this policy demonstrates SA attempt to replicate the 
growth model used by the developed and larger economies of the world.347 
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The country has also adopted other legislation in relation to international trade. The Counterfeit 
Goods Act348 seeks to protect the market from counterfeit goods. It conferred powers on the police 
to search premises for such goods without a warrant in certain circumstances and allows customs 
officials to seize and detain such goods or suspected counterfeit goods.349 
 
3.2.5 Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
3.2.5.1 South African Customs Union (SACU) 
As noted above, SA has entered into various bilateral and multilateral agreements that seek to 
develop and strengthen trade relations with other countries. One of the most important of these 
agreements is the Trade Developmental and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) which is discussed 
in the following chapter. 
 
The Southern African Customs Union350 was entered into on 11 December 1969 and replaced the 
agreement of 1910, making it the longest standing customs agreement in the world. It was 
concluded between SA, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. It is binding on SA as it is a 
self-executing agreement; the agreement itself prescribes its applicability within a specific 
territory.351 Annual meetings are held to discuss agreements; however, some committees such as 
the Trade and Industry Liaison Committee and the Ad hoc Sub-Committee on Agriculture meet 
three times a year.352 SACU’s main objectives, is to maintain the free interchange of goods 
amongst member countries.353 It also seeks to integrate member states into the global economy 
through enhanced trade and investment.354 The agreement provides for a common external and 
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excise tariff for the customs area. It is important in uniting Southern African countries and helping 
them to develop.  
 
SACU also enters into trade agreements with other unions or trade blocs. One such agreement is 
the Free Trade Agreement between the European Free Trade Association355 (EFTA) States and 
SACU States. This agreement opens trade between the blocs with the goal of creating a free trade 
area with tariff reductions on certain goods including industrial goods (such as fish and other 
marine products) and processed agricultural products. Basic agricultural products are covered by 
bilateral agreements with individual EFTA States; these include the Agricultural Agreement 
between the SACU States and Iceland.356 However, all these agreements are subject to the WTO’s 
rules, regulations and agreements.357 
 
SA is party to the Trade, Investment and Developmental Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA)358 
through SACU. This agreement between SACU and the USA is different from the free trade area 
with the EFTA as it makes provision for parties to sign and negotiate agreements relating to 
customs cooperation and technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS), all of which have their own agreements at the WTO. As with other agreements, the TIDCA 
established a forum for engagement between members on growth through investment and matters 
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of common interest.359 This agreement is important for the SACU countries as member countries 
exported about $9.4 billion to the US in 2013 alone. It is even more significant for SA as 90% of 
these exports, totalling $8.5 billion were from that country.360 The US imported $259 million worth 
of agricultural products from SACU in 2013. Its positive effects on SACU are demonstrated by 
the fact that exports to the US ($9.4 billion) exceeded imports from that country ($7.6 billion).361 
 
Furthermore, SACU has extended its agreements to other developing nations. The SACU-
Mercosur362 Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) was signed on 16 December 2004 and took 
agriculture into account. It was replaced by the 2008363 agreement which included additional 
protocols.  This was the first agreement between SACU and another regional economic group of 
developing countries.364 It enabled SACU to extend its relations with these South American 
countries through promoting cooperation and opening up discussions for further tariff preferences. 
Tariff preferences offer access to markets and increased trade opportunities, benefitting both 
regions. While the agreement covers a narrow range of products from the agricultural, fisheries 
and industrial sector, it offers trade concessions on about 1 000 specific products.365 This 
agreement has resulted in significant agricultural liberalisation. SA’s (the largest economy in 
SACU) agricultural exports to Mercosur increased from R69.7 million in 2003 to R126.2 million 
in 2008. However, this was significantly less than imports from Mercosur which increased from 
R2.7 billion in 2003 to R10.7 billion in 2008.366 While the agreement has thus the agreement has 
worked to the benefit of Mercosur rather than SACU, this is nonetheless an important trade 
agreement for developing economies. 
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3.2.5.2 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
SA is a member of one of the most important trading blocs on the African continent, the Southern 
African Development Community367 (SADC). SADC was formally formed on 17 August 1992 
after the Treaty of Southern African Development Community was signed in Namibia.368 It 
replaced the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).369 As with 
many other agreements discussed here, it aims to promote cooperation between nations and to 
strengthen their socio-economic and political relationship. The SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) 
established through the SADC Protocol on Trade370 aims to remove trade barriers, thereby 
strengthening trade relations in the region and to prohibit unfair business practices among member 
states.371 The FTA was established in August 2008 with 85% duty free trade.372 Maximum tariff 
liberalisation was achieved by January 2012 with the completion of the tariff phase down 
process.373  The FTA is extremely difficult to achieve in its entirety especially since most of the 
trade that the members of SADC engage in is with counties outside the region.374 
 
SADC trade is again dominated by SA which is one of the strongest economies in the bloc. While 
critics are sceptical of the FTA, since its implementation in 2000, intra-SADC trade more than 
doubled from $13.2 billion to about $34 billion in 2009, a 155% increase.375 Agricultural trade is 
a key component of the agreement and its liberalisation increases trade and strengthens the 
economies of these developing nations. While the largest portion of SA’s exports goes to the EU, 
it exports about $15 772 million worth of goods to other African countries, of which $10 388 
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million worth goes to SADC countries and $261 million to SACU countries only.376 The import 
statistics are similar; SA imports the most from the EU377, but of the $9 541 million worth of goods 
imported from Africa in 2012, $5 660 million worth came from SADC countries compared to $487 
million from SACU countries, with the balance from countries outside of these two groups. The 
SADC FTA is thus extremely beneficial to SA.378 
 
3.2.5.3 Other Trade Agreements 
SA is also a party to bilateral trade agreements such as the Zimbabwe/SA Bilateral Trade 
Agreement,379 a preferential trade agreement between the two states. In 2015, SA and Zimbabwe 
entered into five agreements, including a Memorandum of Understanding on Trade 
Cooperation.380 SA and China have recently signed 26 agreements linked to investment and 
development which will increase trade between the countries. China is the African continent’s 
biggest trading partner and bilateral agreements between the two countries will promote economic 
and industrial development which it is speculated SA will be the main beneficiary of.381 SA also 
benefits from unilateral agreements of assistance such as the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act382 (AGOA) which gives sub-Saharan African countries duty free access to US markets.383 In 
order to qualify, they need to fulfil certain requirements such as improving the rule of Law and 
respecting core labour standards.384 Since these are set by the US this Agreement is highly 
prescriptive. SA has recently been at loggerheads with the US over chicken imports. The US 
threatened to withdraw AGOA assistance. However, this did not occur.385 While it is 
acknowledged that the agreement has a varying effect on the agricultural trade of countries in 
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Africa, it is praised for the benefits of duty free trade, with around R780 million worth of 
























3.3 Part B: The Development of the European Union’s Agricultural Trade 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The EU is a unique formation, which is made up of various operational and decision-making arms. 
This part of the chapter analyses the structure and functionality of the EU and its decision making 
processes. The EU’s main policy on agriculture, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is briefly 
discussed, as the main focus of this dissertation is SA and the extent to which such affects EU 
trade. 
 
3.3.2 The European Union 
The EU is an international organisation387 that is made up of 28 independent states388 in Europe.389 
It’s predecessor, the European Community was formed after WWII to foster economic relations 
and development between European states. Over the years it has changed from a purely economic 
to a political organisation which takes decisions through treaties and enters into political 
agreements with other states and organisations that are binding on all of its members. One of its 
most significant economic decisions was to have a single currency, the Euro (€) for all its members 
(except the UK). This ensured economic growth and expanded trade.390 
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The EU has various institutions with different roles and functions. Its highest and most important 
body is the European Parliament which rotates between Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg.391 
There are 751 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who are directly voted into office 
every five years by citizens of the EU. It is presided over by the President of the EU Parliament.392 
The Parliament has three main roles. Firstly, it has a legislative function together with the EU 
Council and is responsible for passing law. Secondly, since it is a democratically elected body it 
has democratic supervision over all EU institutions and can reject nominations of Commissioners 
as well as censure the Commission. Finally, together with the Council, it controls the EU budget 
and therefore can influence EU spending393 and the flow of funds into and from the EU. 
 
The European Council is another important institute of the EU and is made up of Presidents or 
Prime Ministers of member states. It meets four times a year to discuss the EUs political decisions 
and to decide on its priorities. The EU President and the EU Commission’s President also sit in 
the EU Council. The Council does not adopt legislation but rather discusses issues on which the 
Commission is then asked to draft legislation. The majority of decisions in the European Council 
are taken by a simple majority; however, only heads of governments are allowed to vote.394 
 
The Council is another EU institution that should not be confused with the European Council. It 
consists of a Minister from each Member state. The Council makes policy decision by passing 
laws through the Ministers who have the authority to bind their states. It discusses; debates, amends 
and adopts legislation.395 Council meetings are open to the public. 
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The European Commission is said to be the driving force within the EU’s institutional system. It 
implements the decisions of the EU Parliament and the Council, especially legislative ones.396 
Members of the commission are appointed by their states to run the EU. The Commission is an 
independent institution which has no political ties to any State. Although the Commissioners are 
appointed by their countries, they do not have a political mandate and they should not be influenced 
by their homeland, but act in the best interests of the Union. The commission is accountable to the 
Parliament which can dismiss it through a motion of censure. It attends all Parliamentary sittings 
and answers questions on proposed policies. The 28 Commissioners meet once a week with each 
Commissioner in charge of a particular policy area. 397 The EU has various other institutions such 
as the National Parliament, the Court of Justice and the European Central Bank that are not 
discussed here.398 Annexure A on page 115 shows decision making in the EU. 
 
3.3.3 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
Various EU policies regulate trade in different sectors between EU members. The Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) applies to all EU members; however, the finer details of its application 
and specific commitments may differ from state to state.399 The CAP was one of the founding 
agreements of the European Community.400  It provided a framework for food and agricultural 
programmes to address the food crisis in Europe. The CAP was part of the Rome Treaty which 
was signed in 1958401 but came into effect in 1963 and focused on four main areas: developing a 
unified market in the EU with the free movement of agricultural goods; all costs linked to the CAP 
were to be funded by a common treasury with money also being sourced from tariffs; EU products 
would be given preference over imported goods (this has changed since the formation of the 
WTO); and the CAP aimed to level the playing field for farmers and other industries whilst at the 
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same time providing consumers with food at a reasonable price.402 The CAP is an important part 
of EU policy and in 2011 42% of EU budget was contributed towards it (€141.2 billion).403 
 
While EU members generally have high levels of agricultural production, economic strain, 
increased imports and as ever increasing fuel costs make it more difficult to compete in this 
market.404 In order to sustain agribusiness, farmers need additional financial support.  The CAP 
supports farmers through direct payments or domestic support as catered for in the AoA, price 
guarantees and other instruments which include tariffs and quotas on some imported products.405 
All funds directed towards agricultural producers within states can no longer come from individual 
governments but have to be administered via the CAP.406 This creates a uniform system which 
ensures that domestic support is equal among EU members, preventing unfair competition. The 
CAP uses a principle called ‘decoupling’ which shifts the focus from production to promoting 
environmentally-friendly practices and market-based dynamics.407 ‘Therefore, more public 
financial support directly relates to the proper stewardship of land and farmers’ practices are 
remunerated for their capacity to deliver the basic public goods desired by European society.’408 
 
The CAP is divided into two parts. The first is direct payments (domestic support), which support 
market development, and come from the EC budget.409 This is an area-based mechanism where 
farmers are given direct payments to stabilise their income, based on the area they manage. This 
system was introduced in 2013; previously pastoralists received a payment for each head of 
livestock they managed.410 This method ensures the permanent up keep of land and prevents it 
from becoming arid or infertile. The second part is support for farmer’s initiatives and multi-annual 
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rural development measures which include but are not limited to environmental protection; this is 
co-financed by member states. The measures are applied differently in different states based on 
the principle of subsidiary.411 This part largely focuses on the EU’s rural development policy. It 
rests on three main axes.  Firstly, it improves competitiveness through support for innovation, 
restructuring and development; secondly it improves the countryside and the environment through 
support for land management and helps to fight climate change, and finally it encourages 
diversification of economic activities and improving the quality of life in rural areas. The CAP has 
various other schemes in different countries that cater for their specific agricultural needs,412 such 
as the traditional livestock breeding scheme in Bulgaria413 or the Oxtail transitional cooperation 
project in Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Germany.414 The CAP is important for the 
EU; in 2013 it was the largest food exporter in the world and sustaining and growing agriculture 
is in the best interests of the EU.415 
 
The 2013 CAP reform transformed it to make farmers more environmentally-friendly and 
conscious, encourage research and spread knowledge about more sustainable farming practices 
and a fairer support system for farmers. In the long term, this places farmers in a stronger position 
along the food chain.416 The reform also aims to educate consumers about the food they eat as all 
products are required to have detailed labels which include the country of origin as well as the 
ingredients.417 The CAP reform also promotes fair trade with developing countries. As required 
by the AoA, its export subsidies mean that imported goods from developing countries can enter 
the EU with ease.418 The CAP is therefore very important in regulating and supporting the largest 
trade market in the EU. While it has transformed in order to meet WTO requirements, substantial 
support is directed to agricultural development, strengthening the EU and its member States. 
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The CAP is also important for SA as it informs EU decisions before entering into any trade 
agreements which affect agriculture. When the TDCA was being negotiated, the CAP had to be 
taken into consideration and all further discussions relating to the TDCA will have to be in line 
with CAP and other EU agricultural trade agreements. As SA is bound by ITAC, so too is the EU 
bound by the CAP. 
 
3.4 Conclusion Parts A & B 
Part A demonstrated that change in government leads to change in fiscal policy. This has a direct 
impact on with whom and how a country trades. It examined how South African trade policies and 
laws changed following the demise of apartheid and how trade liberalisation has been incorporated 
into the legal system. SA’s political transition had a direct effect on SA’s policy stance as it entered 
new agreements with diverse partners to build economic ties. The chapter also reviewed the trade 
agreements entered into by SA in recognition of the increasing importance of international trade. 
SA is more alert to trade developments that not only work to its benefit but to the regional block 
it belongs to. Trade blocs sometimes have more power than individual states; therefore, their 
importance cannot be overemphasised and they benefit the entire continent. The agreements 
entered into either focus directly on agriculture, or as will be seen later in the TDCA, include 
elements that impact this sector. This promotes lows tariffs and open agricultural markets not only 
for SA to access but for the country to apply. Agricultural trade increases and the sector is enhanced 
through the introduction of new technologies and access to inputs such as certain fertilisers. Such 
improvements are highly beneficial to agricultural production in developing countries like SA. 
Finally, Part A offered insight into why the EU is SA’s main trading partner. Colonial ties with 
Europe and the continent’s strong investment in the South African economy nurtured a strong 






Part B highlighted the complex EU framework. While member states are independent, they are 
bound by all EU decisions. The multi-layered decision making process ensures fairness at all stages 
of governance. The single currency and open markets make the EU an extremely successful trading 
bloc not only in the international community but for its members. The CAP guides EU agricultural 
development and ensures that farming is sustainable. It encourages farmers to become more 
environmentally-friendly which in turn ensures the sustainability of the agricultural sector. The 
CAP is a founding document which binds the EU and has a direct effect on agriculture as it informs 
trade policy as does ITAC for SA.  
 
The chapter showed that trade developments and changes which are country specific have a direct 
impact on international trade as well as particular regional or bilateral agreements. The 
understanding of agricultural policy changes over the years due to supply and demand curves as 
well as climate change which has also informed many current policy positions and affects 
agricultural producers and consumers in any country, especially in the EU and SA where the 















THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND ITS 
EFFECT ON SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The TDCA419 is by and large a trade liberalisation agreement between the EU and SA. It includes 
all EU member States including Great Britain and Ireland which form part of the EU. While 
extremely technical, the agreement deals directly with a few areas within the trade sector, 
especially agriculture, which is analysed in this chapter. As its name suggests, it focuses on trade, 
development and cooperation; the current study hones in on the trade component.  
 
This chapter examines the nature of the TDCA and the impact of its implementation.  It begins by 
outlining the history and objectives of the agreement. The agreement is analysed focusing on the 
trade aspect. Its benefits for both SA and the EU are discussed and various problems that arise are 
highlighted. Since this study is primarily concerned with SA, the effects of the agreement are 
considered from a South African perspective in relation to the EU. The problems considered 
include market access, subsidisation, high health standards, the impact on employment and 
particular issues relating to SACU. The chapter ends by assessing the extent to which the TDCA 
is beneficial or detrimental to SA’s current agricultural dynamics. 
 
4.2 Part A: Introduction to the Trade Development Cooperation Agreement between SA 
and the European Union 
 
4.2.1 History and Objectives  
                                                          




The TDCA was signed in Pretoria on 11 October 1999 but only entered into full force on 1 May 
2004. However, some provisions420 which fall within EU competence have been applied since 
1 January 2000.421 Its objectives are clearly stated in Article 1 and include:  
‘developing a closer relationship between parties, helping SA in its consolidation of its economic 
and social foundational transition, to contribute to the social and economical development of 
Southern Africa through regional cooperation and integration, to see the mutual trade 
liberalisation  of goods, services and capital and promote expansion of such interaction, to 
smoothly and gradually integrate South Africa into the world economy and finally to enhance 
the relationship of the EU and SA through greater cooperation which will be in their mutual 
interest.’422 
Respect for human rights and democratic principles are an essential part of the agreement.423 
Linked to this is the encouragement of continuous political dialogue between the EU and SA to 
promote understanding of the positions and interests of the parties, encourage support for 
democracy and human rights and to promote social justice. These dialogues can happen at various 
levels from the Parliamentary level down to the diplomats or representatives.424 
 
4.2.2 Trade Component of the TDCA 
Trade is central in Title II of the agreement. Article 5 establishes a FTA between the parties in 
accordance with clauses in the agreement discussed below as well as those which conform to WTO 
standards. The FTA had to be established in SA within a 12 year period and within the EU within 
a 10 year period starting from the year the agreement came into effect, i.e., the year 2000.425 As a 
developing country, SA was granted more time as acting too quickly could have had adversely 
effects. 426 The FTA is not only important to agriculture but to trade as a whole as an entire range 
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of goods427 are covered. Common to FTA’s, ‘liberalisation of trade in services and free movement 
of capital’428 are also covered.429 Both parties commit to tariff elimination through abolishing or 
reducing custom duties. Article 9430 makes it compulsory for the parties to abolish any charge 
which has an effect equivalent to customs duties imposed on imported goods. This means that the 
EU is meeting its obligation under the AoA with regard to market access and tariffication. Custom 
duties on items listed in the Annexures to the agreement were to be reduced gradually, although 
there had to be a 75%431 reduction on the basic duty at the time when the agreement was entered 
into for most products, excluding agricultural goods. In terms of the agreement, further reductions 
would occur over specified periods of time which differ for the parties as well as for different 
items. 
 
The reductions for agriculture are different from the rest of the products. The reductions are quite 
extensive. For items in Annex IV list 1432, the initial reduction is 75% for both parties. However 
for List 2 the initial reduction is 91% for the EU with 10 years to reach total abolishment433 and 
67% for SA with five years to reach total abolishment.434 Customs duties for items in List 3 need 
to be reduced by 87% within three years435 for the EU with final abolishment occurring within 10 
years; and 88% within five years for SA with final abolishment occurring within 12 years.436 This 
somewhat replicates the commitments required of countries in the AoA with developed countries 
(the EU) having to commit to more reduction in a shorter time while less developed (SA) or least 
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developing countries have  to commit to less reduction over a longer period.437 The agreement sees 
a total tariff reduction of 95% on goods entering the EU and 86% on goods entering SA.438 
 
This analysis offers insight into how the AoA affects the relationship between SA and the EU. 
Trade agreements which cover agricultural trade now show the same level of commitment and 
application as the AoA. As such, it can be argued that the AoA directly influences the current trade 
relationship between these two particular partners. Because this agreement is the main agreement 
on trade between SA and the EU, to a great extent the effects of the TDCA which can be felt in 
the South African agricultural sector are a product of the AoA. 
 
Article 16439 deals with agricultural safeguards where harm is caused or threatened by one partners 
in the markets of the other due to sensitivity in the agricultural market. The TDCA also states that 
a review of the agreement must be conducted after five years and steps must be taken to further 
liberalise trade. Article 19440 does not allow any new duties to be introduced or any restrictions on 
the quantity of imports; this increases market access. Agricultural policy is again highlighted in 
Article 20 441 which states that regular consultations should be held on agricultural policies and 
their respective strategies and practical modalities. 
The agreement also encapsulates other agreements. Article 23.1 states:  
‘Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or affect in any way the taking, by either Party, of anti-
dumping or countervailing measures in accordance with Article VI of the GATT 1994, the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, annexed to the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO.’442  
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This shows that the agreement does not function outside of the WTO framework. It goes on to 
state that consultations on constructive remedies should be held before such measures are taken.443 
 
In this respect, at face value the agreement seems problematic because of the lack of safeguards. 
However Articles 24 to 26 introduce safeguard mechanisms. Where imported goods threaten or 
cause harm to domestic producers who produce like or the same product, or when increased import 
of a particular good causes or threatens to cause economic deterioration to the EU’s outermost 
region or to other members of the SACU,444 exceptional measures may be taken.445 These include 
the introduction or an increase in customs duties446 (however, strict regulations and rules for the 
application of these measures are set out in Article 25).447 The TDCA requires that, before adopting 
any of these exceptional measures, a procedure needs to be followed.448 Rules of Origin,449 which 
are extremely detailed, are covered in Protocol 1450 as highlighted in Article 28 which is additional 
to the agreement.451 This Protocol is not discussed in detail in this thesis. 
 
Free competition among EU and South African companies is further enhanced by the TDCA as it 
includes provisions which avoid abuse by firms with a dominant position in the market.452  
Protection of intellectual property453 is also recognized by the TDCA and South African 
competition laws will be reconstructed through technical assistance provided by the EU; the 
agreements also provides for urgent consultations.454 While developmental cooperation set out in 
the agreement is not analysed further, it is important to note that the agreement provided for SA to 
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receive €980 million in development aid for the period 2007 to 2013.455 Finally, the agreement 
states that economic cooperation between the parties will promote the growth of both economies 
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4.3 Part B: Effect of the TDCA on SA and the European Union 
 
4.3.1 Benefits of the TDCA 
Authors such as Jeffery Lewis, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder argue that the TDCA 
brings more good than harm to SA.457 They agree that there will be an increase in EU exports, 
especially products that had higher tariffs before the TDCA; these mainly include fruit and 
vegetables.458 However research shows that South African exports to the EU increased by 75% 
since the implementation of the TDCA. Exports to Sweden (mainly wine and textiles) increased 
by 419%, with those to Austria, Spain and Ireland also showing strong increases.459 SA’s most 
important export partners are the United Kingdom and Germany.460 This is due to the long standing 
relationship between SA and the United Kingdom together and Germany’s need for South African 
goods. Import from the EU increased by 93%, while those from France increased by 221% with 
the biggest increase being in turbo-jets, petroleum and tyres.461 R43 billion worth of goods were 
imported from Germany which was SA’s largest importer within the EU. Countries like Spain and 
Portugal also saw an increase in exports to SA.462 
 
On the other hand, Lorenzo Jachia and Ethel Teljeur argue that the TDCA will also bring about 
trade diversion.463 Jacob Viner explains that this occurs when imports from a low-cost producing 
non-member (not a party to the free trade 464agreement) country are stopped by the country which 
is a member of the FTA. Instead, the member imports its products from a high-cost producing 
member country.465 This increases the volume of imports as the tariffs are removed, which 
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represents trade creation.466 The diversion occurs when trade which would ordinarily go to the 
non-member party is diverted to the member party. Trade relations between the non-member party 
and the member party are strained especially in light of SA’s trade with other SADC members 
who are not part of the TDCA.467 The price difference between the low-cost producing non-
member country and the high-cost producing member country will determine the size of trade 
diversion.468 The data in the diagram below469 shows that, while there has been an increase in 
imports from African states, exports to African States have declined, mainly due to the decrease 
in the SACU area. 
 
Source: European Commission-Directorate General for Trade470 
 
4.3.2 Problems arising out of the TDCA 
A number of problems have arisen since the conclusion of the TDCA. For the purpose of this 
study, market access, subsidies, high health standards, problems within SACU and employment 
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are discussed in order to substantiate the conclusion that the TDCA may have not have been the 
most ideal agreement for SA to be party to. 
 
4.3.2.1 Market Access 
There has been opposition to the agreement since its inception. In the year 2000, the South African 
business community spoke out against it, stating that it was too idealistic and that the open market 
system would be detrimental to uncompetitive industries that relied on the closed system of trade 
that the country once had.471 It was noted that the textiles, clothing and automotive sectors would 
be most affected. Industry leaders predicted as many as 40 000 jobs would be lost in Mpumalanga 
Province.472 EU products were openly and easily able to enter South African markets. The sudden 
change in the dynamics of certain industries, with large volumes of EU products entering the 
market, caused many local manufacturers who were not able to adapt fast enough, to shut down, 
increasing job losses. This was the first sign that the agreement could be counterproductive as job 
creation was one of it cornerstones. 
 
Eurostep argues that the agreement is more beneficial to the EU as SA opens its market to a greater 
extent.473 Before the TDCA, SA was able to export more duty free commodities than the EU; the 
agreement changes this situation.474 
Figure 4.1: European Union’s Exports and Imports with SA in Billion Euros 
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Source: European Union475 
The data in the above figure show that at the time when the agreement was implemented, the EU 
imported more from SA than it exported, amounting to 14.5 billion Euros. 476 Four years later, EU 
exports to SA exceeded imports. Empirical evidence suggests that between 1994 and 2004 SA 
exports to the EU increased by 75%, while imports from the EU increased by 93%.477 Thus, open 
SA markets have been extremely beneficial to the EU and could have negative effects on local 
manufacturers. 
 
Farmers in SA have argued that the market access envisaged in the agreement is skewed as it 
allows the EU more access to South African markets. South African markets were opened up to 
the EU to about 81% whilst EU markets were only opened up to about 62%.478 This was seen as 
extremely unfair to SA producers. The data further indicates that in 2012 SA only retained 
protection over 108 product lines whereas the EU maintained protection over 615 product lines. 
Sugar is one of the protected products on the EU list and requests to remove it have caused some 
concern on the part of the Europeans, especially considering the vast amount of sugar SA 
produces.479 Rudi Richards of the South African Fruit and Vegetable Canners’ Association argued 
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that quota-free and duty-free access to the EU would bring in R1.5 billion worth of investment, 
which would boost growth and employment.480 This suggests once again that the agreement works 
in favour of the EU. It is assumed that this is due to the EU’s financial and bargaining power, 
resulting in smaller developing countries like SA compromising far more than they ordinarily 
would in order to conclude the agreement. This could be described as a form of manipulation by 
the developed country of the developing country.  
 
It is commonly argued that developing countries are manipulated into certain concessions by, to 
all intents and purposes, being held ransom by developed countries that are not willing to enter 
into agreements unless their terms are met. This sort of ‘manipulative bargaining’ can be seen in 
various other trade agreements and at the WTO itself. The collapse of various rounds of WTO 
negotiations, especially within the realm of agriculture discussed in previous chapters, can be said 
to be a product of such processes. Negotiations are always difficult and developing countries are 
not able secure an optimal outcome. Indeed, in recent times they have abandoned negotiations. 
The only ray of hope lies in the collective power of developing nations as they support one another 
and are able to stand up to the global super powers.  
 
However in bi-lateral agreements, the developing country often has very few bargaining chips to 
ensure that the agreement favours its interests. This has become increasingly problematic in 
relation to WTO agreements that aim to protect such countries, yet fail to do so. This leads one to 
question the core functionality of the WTO and whether it is still achieving its goals, especially 
with regard to the AoA. Oxfam International expresses concerns about the effects that agreements 
such as the TDCA have on smaller developing countries due to serious competition from European 
multinationals.481 Phil Bloomer argues that unless there is a shift in the way that negotiations are 
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conducted and in what is negotiated, such agreements will produce free trade deals that damage 
the economies of smaller countries.482 
 
Due to various complaints and concerns regarding excessive imports from the EU, in 2013, the 
International Trade Administration Commission of SA (ITAC) published guidelines for safeguard 
applications. Rian Geldenhuys argues that there was a need for an increase in applications against 
the EU as the TDCA negatively impacted the local agriculture sector.483 The ITAC noted that local 
agri-processing companies were struggling to compete with imports from the EU.484 EU imports 
entered SA duty free due and local companies could not match their prices. The new regulations 
addressed some key aspects of the problems confronting South African producers. It made lodging 
applications with the ITAC easier as dumping or a surge of EU products in the market did not have 
to be proved; the only thing local manufactures would have to prove is that the imports harmed 
them. 485 This makes the requirements set out in the agreement far less strenuous. It is important 
as smaller companies or producers, which are the majority of South African producers, did not 
have the resources to prove the burdensome requirements of the TDCA as well as those of the 
WTO’s Anti-Dumping agreement.486  
 
Increased access to markets increases competition for local manufacturers and despite the 
guidelines set by ITAC to assist farmers the bottom line is that many imports cannot be prevented 
as the agreement and the FTA created in it are geared towards opening the market to foreign goods. 
If SA implements stringent assessment and guidelines, the EU will do the same and since SA relies 
on the EU for trade, thus would have a more damaging effect on the former than the latter. 
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Ultimately, it appears that SA is put in position where it simply has to accept the increase in imports 
and allow a few farmers to suffer for the greater good of trade relations. 
 
As noted earlier, the TDCA governs trade relations between SA and the EU, but interestingly, in 
other poor African countries, the effects in respect of onerous agricultural terms are similar and 
direct comparisons can be drawn. In Mozambique for example, local farmers are not able to 
produce sugar on their extremely fertile land because they have been denied access to the market. 
Oxfam International has referred to the situation in Mozambique as ‘the great EU sugar scam’.487 
African farmers argue that the EU strives to create a dependency system, thus ensuring a monopoly 
of power. Quotas work to the detriment of Mozambique as the amount of sugar allowed to enter 
the EU is restricted. Although it costs only R2 200 to produce white processed sugar in 
Mozambique compared to Europe with a cost of R6 300, subsidies make farming in the EU far 
more profitable and cheaper.488 Taken together with the fact that Mozambican farmers cannot 
access EU markets, the sugar sector suffers greatly, jeopardising jobs and entire industries in 
developing countries.489 This endorses the notion of skewed market access in the agreement as can 
be seen in the number of lines protected in the EU and SA.  In 2003 sugar reform was still not on 
the table in the EU’s latest reform considerations and African farmers feel that the western world 
is manipulating them with aid rather than increasing trade.490  
 
4.3.2.2 Impact of Subsidies 
Concerns have been raised about the amount of subsidies received by farmers in the two different 
regions. In the EU, it is reported that farmers received up to 50% subsidies for their production 
while their South African counterparts only received about 10%.491 This means that EU farmers 
could sell their goods for a far lower price, especially given that they now pay very few tariffs.492 
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This made it difficult for South African farmers to compete. Ordinarily, tariffs would be the way 
to increase prices and make them more market related but without this measure there is no 
protection for local producers. The benefits of the agreement seem to be eroded by the EU 
‘including reduction and/or elimination of EU MFN tariffs at the multilateral level, and reform of 
EU domestic support schemes particularly in products subject to commodity protocols.’493  
 
Furthermore, in 2001 the EU subsidised its farmers in excess of $103.5 billion with the majority 
of funds going to French farmers, as that country was the world’s second largest agricultural 
producer following the US.494 In 2004, $310 billion was awarded in agricultural subsidies; six 
times more than developing nations received in aid.495 This contradicts various statements made 
by the EU on its plans to reduce farming subsidies as these tripled in a three-year period. This 
supports the notion that the economic growth of the EU is more important than global integration 
and development.  
 
The majority of these subsidies go to large agri-business which only make up 25% of farmers, yet 
receive 89% of the support.496 This is a problem for EU farmers. According to Desta, large EU 
multinationals are allowed to dominate the market as they become the leading producer of a 
particular good.497 This works to the benefit of the EU as it becomes the largest producer of a 
particular product which can be dumped on developing countries at a low price. In essence they 
control the market for that particular product. This has two direct effects on farmers in the EU. 
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It is common knowledge that, small to medium farmers in the EU do not have access to the level 
of subsidies the multinationals receive. Competing for them is difficult with negative impacts on 
their output and profitability. Subsistence farmers are not able to sustain themselves and run at a 
loss. On the other hand, the agricultural industry in developing countries is even worse affected. 
Local producers cannot compete with the large multinationals that dump cheap goods on local 
markets as they receive small subsidies. Larger producers are also unable to survive and shut down, 
causing job losses. The end result is that large multinationals soon become the only producer of 
the product and are able to regulate the market. This scenario is present in both the US and the EU. 
 
The effects of skewed subsidisation have been observed in a number of industries. It is reported 
that the average cow in Europe received a $2 a day subsidy which is twice the income of most 
Africans.498 In 2001 the SA cotton industry shed more than 24 000 jobs due to its inability to 
compete with foreign goods whose products were heavily subsidised to the tune of $4.4 billion.499 
SA’s Democratic Alliance argues that making small scale farming unsustainable makes land 
redistribution more difficult to achieve.500 Moreover, tariff barriers cost developing nations like 
SA around $100 billion a year, twice the amount they receive in aid.501 South African farmers 
receive between R6 to R8 billion per year in subsidies.502 Although efforts have been made to 
increase the amount to R11 billion, they have not come to fruition.503 The support has not been 
trade distorting and falls under the Green Box of the AoA.  
 
Not all subsidies go directly to farmers, as other programmes such as school nutrition programmes 
also fall under these subsidies. This means that they are slightly distorted.504  With regard to direct 
support under the Amber Box SA is limited to about R2 billion under the WTO505; therefore the 
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subsidies are far less than what the EU provides to its farmers and not much can be done to change 
the situation. SA has also not made full use of the R500 million export subsidies that it was able 
to use in the past few years. 
 
Besides direct subsidies to support farmers, indirect subsidies such as pesticide ones have also 
been low which puts SA farmers at risk as they are not able to obtain the most advanced pesticides 
on the market and suffer significant production losses.506 This dilemma was experienced in 
Indonesian rice industry in the early 1990s.507 Although subsidies for pesticides have been 
discontinued in most parts of the world, support to develop new and enhanced pesticides continues, 
which South African farmers do not seem to benefit from. 
 
Ultimately, South African farmers’ ability to compete with subsidised farmers from Europe leads 
to the latter dumping their goods on the South African market at a rate that SA cannot compete 
with. Between 2006 and 2008 there was a 263% increase in wheat imports, with about 1.6 million 
tons imported per year.508 Local wheat production is a third of what it was in the 1990s.509  From 
1993 to 2008, the number of farmers in SA dropped by 31%, 510 South African food consumption 
patterns have changed significantly post-1994. The rise of the middle class led to decreased maize 
and wheat consumption and an increase in meat and chicken consumption. The last-mentioned, 
increased from 6kgs to 27kgs per person per year, creating the need to import chicken.511 While 
chicken farmers have increased production, they are unable to meet demand.512 Low government 
subsidies coupled with the lack of advanced technologies makes keeping up with demand very 
difficult.  As witnessed recently in the AGOA saga, the need for poultry compromises SA’s 
position513. It is difficult for SA to negotiate effectively when the country is in desperate need of 
                                                          












poultry. Indeed, the country has gone as far as to accept a drop in quality and health standards, 
which in most cases are lower than those required in SA, to avoid damaging trade relations. This 
again forces SA to do deal with situations in a manner that it ordinarily avoids or that it is not 
comfortable with. Instead of levelling the playing field, developed states continue to have the upper 
hand. 
 
The above discussion suggests that South African farmers have suffered in the tough economic 
climate in the country as high fuel prices have also affected productivity as well as profitability. 
Although not a direct subsidy, the fuel support offered to motorists in Europe makes farming more 
profitable. The South African sugar industry is one of the hardest hit sectors as transportation of 
sugar increased from R1 a bag in 1980 to R10 a bag in recent years.514 2009 also saw the Sasol 
scandal which affected the food price and was discovered much later than it should have been due 
to SA’s lack of resources.515 The developmental aspect of the TDCA was supposed to assist SA to 
make progress in this regard; however, few technological advances have been shared and the 
country remains in a disadvantaged position. Fuel aid benefits producers in developed countries, 
reinforcing the earlier argument that the better the resources, the greater the productivity which 
leads to more control of the sector. It is for this reason that the agricultural market is dominated by 
developed countries. 516 
 
4.3.2.3 High Health Standards  
Despite tariff and quantity restrictions being removed, countries still use quality standards to limit 
trade. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures517 (SPS) is often 
                                                          
SA cannot meet the demand for chicken and despite AGOA having a negative effect due to the terms of the 
agreement SA had to accept it. The agreement sees chicken of a lower quality entering the country at cheaper prices 
which causes a shift in the market. This is not the only issue with the agreement. Others include market access and 
subsidisation. This creates an unfair trading environment. 
514 A Goldblatt ‘Agriculture: Facts & Trades South Africa’ WWF 2009 available at 
http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf. 
515 Sasol and fertilizer companies colluded which increased the food price. Sasol was later fined R250 million.  
516 A Goldblatt ‘Agriculture: Facts & Trades South Africa’ WWF 2009 available at 
http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf. 




used by states to limit goods coming into their country on grounds permitted by the WTO such as 
quality which has a health and safety effect.518 Former South African Minister of Finance Mr 
Trevor Manuel noted that ‘high tariffs remain a significant barrier, but non-tariff barriers, such as 
arbitrarily imposed phytosanitary rules, further limit goods.’519 In 2007 SA imported a fertilizer 
from China which contained substances banned in the EU, resulting in the EU banning all 
pineapple imports from SA and causing massive losses to the farmers in the Eastern Cape,520 one 
of the country’s poorest regions. These standards make exporting difficult as it is impossible for 
SA farmers to know the effects some of imported products, such as pesticides and fertilizers, will 
have on their crop and they do not have the resources to run scientific tests.521 Only once the crop 
is ready is it rejected by the EU on grounds of health standards. Since they are geared up for export, 
it is difficult to re-enter the domestic market.  
 
Pests pose a significant threat to farmers. Insects are able to easily adapt and adjust to different 
circumstances and combat pesticides due to mutations from generation to generation. This forces 
farmers to constantly change their pesticides and the methods they use. Rother, Hall and London 
state that, South African farmers do not have the technology to keep up with the latest pesticides 
and in most cases are forced to simply increase the amount used.522 Since they are being 
encouraged to engage in high production farming to gain commercial status, they increase their 
usage of pesticides, especially given that commercial farming relies on this practice.523 Excessive 
use of pesticides which has been approved in SA has, however, been banned in other parts of the 
world including Europe which makes exporting to European markets extremely difficult which 
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adversely affects the South African exports.524 The South African dilemma is that pesticides which 
are approved in Europe are unaffordable as they are sold predominantly in Europe. On the other 
hand, Chinese pesticides are far cheaper, help farmers meet local demand and also pass South 
African health standards. However, these goods cannot be exported to the EU.525 Thus, although 
SA has increased market access to the EU, it is submitted that in reality, the red tape of the EU 
trade system as well as technical barriers do not provide full access as promised in the agreement.  
 
SA is currently the only country in the world to allow genetic modification of its staple crop, 
maize.526 Although it works for SA as it is able to deal with the high demand for maize within the 
country. Importing nations do not accept genetically modified maize. It is for this reason that the 
EU does not accept the import of any maize from SA.527 Despite the TDCA allowing for free flow 
of trade, it restricts trade as EU standards and methods of production must be met in order for 
goods to enter. Case studies in other developing countries reveal a similar scenario. Currently, the 
Western Cape is the only province that is able to export citrus to the US due to that country’s high 
health and safety standards which only farmers in this region can meet.528 Although this is good 
for the province as more than 50% of USA imported oranges come from the Western Cape, it is 
disadvantageous to other provinces that do not have the infrastructure or resources to produce 
citrus in an acceptable manner.529 
 
4.3.2.4 Problems relating to the South African Customs Union (SACU) 
There has been much tension in SACU since SA signed the TDCA as it extended preferential 
benefits only to SA with regard to trade with the EU. Due to the TDCA, almost all goods from the 
EU will eventually enter the SACU region without duties. This causes considerable loss of tariffs 
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among other SACU members, namely the BLNS530 members. They do not receive the same 
benefits as SA under the TDCA, yet the EU benefits when its goods enter these countries.531 
Leading trade specialist Dot Keet argues that the TDCA has a negative effect on SA532 as the 
country did not take into account the interests of the BLNS members when it singed the TDCA.533 
When the TDCA was first implemented exports increased, but once lower tariffs were introduced, 
EU imports also increased.534 Keet observes that the trade deficit between SA and the EU is 
growing at about two billion euros a year in favour of the EU. She adds that EU exports to SACU 
have increased by 50% since 2003. 535 It is for this reason that Keet argues that the TDCA needs 
to be revised if it is to address the problems and concerns of the BLNS. However, the EU is 
reluctant to enter into such negotiations and is only prepared to discuss an economic partnership 
agreement (EPA) which SA did not sign at that point but did sign in 2014.536 However SACU 
members are careful not to overstep the mark to avoid a reduction in EU aid.537 This again 
highlights how the politics of rich and poor nations play out with poor developing nations having 
to tread lightly to receive much-needed developmental aid from rich nations. The EPA which SA 
has signed tries to balance some of the deficits created by the TDCA by improving access to EU 
markets, but does not address all the issues which arise due to the TDCA.538 
 
Akinkugbe argues that SA’s preferential trade terms with the EU means that there is a risk of EU 
trade with other Southern African countries declining.539 There was considerable decline in exports 
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to African countries by SA from R32 billion in 2002 to R26 billion in 2004.540 Some may argue 
that this is due to the country’s trade focus shifting to the EU, but the evidence is inconclusive. 
There has been no decrease in the export-import relationship between SA and other major partners 
such as China and the USA.541 
 
4.3.2.5 Impact on Employment 
Keet also argues that the TDCA is damaging South African companies.542 Due to the agreement, 
large EU multinationals such as Parmalat were able to enter the country and buy all the dairy 
companies in the Western Cape.543 Parmalat went onto to terminate all supply contracts with local 
dairy companies that supply them with milk and instead imported duty free powdered milk from 
the EU.544 This caused drastic job losses.545 Keet states that although the TDCA envisaged a rapid 
increase in employment, the actual rate is slow with major cuts occurring in different sectors.546  
 
In the 1970s, more than two million people were employed in the South African agricultural sector; 
this dropped to around 700 000 in 2014.547 Land redistribution has been extremely slow with only 
7.5 % of the land being distributed to poor black people for subsistence farming and small 
businesses.548 This means that the majority of South Africans are at the mercy of large 
companies.549 Oxfam has accused the EU of being contradictory in its actions as it says it wants to 
alleviate poverty at global level but its trade policies have the opposite effect.550 The EU promotes 
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trade liberalisation in poor countries which allows its members to infiltrate the market, causing 
industries within developing countries to shut down and job losses; however, they find it difficult 
to allow large corporates from developing nations to operate within their own markets. Anti-
globalisation movements have identified trade as the main cause of global inequality and have 
stated that the EU has done little to directly address this issue. Oxfam adds that trade in itself is 
not problematic, but the rules surrounding it are deeply problematic and are in urgent need of 
global reform.551  Despite the WTO making great strides in this regard, individual packages 
between states (like the TDCA) which are within state jurisdiction due to state sovereignty make 
reform of the entire system essential as developed nations continue to act in their own interests’ 
time and time again. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In principle, and at the time it was agreed on, the TDCA was possibly the ideal agreement. It put 
SA in a good position with the EU in terms of trade, development and cooperation. For a country 
that was emerging from economic sanctions, this agreement was exactly what was needed to enter 
global markets, with none better than its largest trading partner, the EU. Such enthusiasm and the 
fact that SA is a small developing caused it to make concessions which later worked against the 
country. The government opened up the markets very quickly as it thought this would ensure equal 
and swift access to European markets. While this initially worked in SA’s favour, large production 
volumes within the EU meant that more goods would later enter SA than would enter the EU. 
Many South African business leaders challenged accelerated trade liberalisation, with Leslie Boyd 
of Anglo American famously remarking that the government was 'holier than GATT' in reducing 
tariffs at a faster rate than suggested by the WTO.552  
 
The benefits of the TDCA cannot be denied as trade did increase in the early 2000s and some 
South African products continue to dominate the European market. However, the benefits that 
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were anticipated at the time of the agreement were short lived and the TDCA seems to be causing 
severe damage to the country’s agricultural sector. Not only does it negatively affect South African 
agricultural trade with the EU but it affects agricultural production within SACU which could 
ultimately impede the country’s global agricultural trade. The fact that market access is encouraged 
may speak more to the EU than to SA as other barriers to trade can be used to prevent such access 
or make it more difficult, as has been seen in relation to the high health standards set by the EU. 
Other effects on employment and subsidisation are all the product of SA having had to make too 
many compromises in order to receive temporary benefits which are now an active threat to the 
agricultural sector. The TDCA was good for a country that was trying to enter the market but now 
that SA is one of Africa’s leading economies and traders, it appears to stunt its growth and is more 


















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis aimed at achieving a few outcomes with the one ultimate conclusion being drawn. The 
thesis engaged with the following research questions. Firstly, does the agreement on agriculture 
work to equalise trade between nations or does it work to the benefit of developed states and the 
detriment of developing by analaysing its effect on South Africa and the European Union.? 
Secondly, does the AoA, which South Africa has consented to, do more harm than good to South 
Africa especially in light of its trade with one its biggest importers, the EU? Thirdly does this 
agreement work solely to the benefit of the EU as a developed nation, especially in relation to the 
way it trades with developing countries like South Africa which rely heavily on trade income or is 
it also detrimental to the EU? And the main question to be addressed in this thesis is; does the AoA 
have an effect on the trade relationship between South Africa and the European Union? 
 
The study sought to demonstrate the extent to which the AoA has molded the TDCA and the 
relationship between the EU and SA. This chapter concludes the thesis by examining whether the 
agreement is beneficial to the parties to the relationship. It also offers recommendations on a way 
forward with regard to SA-EU trade. In seeking to determine whether the TDCA should remain as 
is or be amended, various issues that challenge the two parties that emerged from the analysis 
presented in the previous chapter are examined and recommendations are made on how the 
problem(s) can be avoided or resolved. Finally, this chapter considers the possible benefits of the 
agreement and places them in context. The relevant literature on the effects of the agreement which 
is molded by the AoA in compliance with WTO standards is referred to in order to locate this 
study’s position in this debate. The conclusion shows the link between the various agreements and 





5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.2.1 Market access 
Given that SA is a developing country553 it is influenced by certain dynamics that impact its 
position within the international trading community. Certain aspects of trade that might be 
acceptable and tolerable in the developed world could cause distress to SA. The South African 
system is also unique in that, due to the country’s political transition, it was forced to evolve 
quickly. 
 
The TDCA changed the face of agricultural trade between SA and the EU. Despite the 
implementation period being about ten years, the change in the trade dynamics of a country that 
was emerging out a period of political and economic instability was not easy. The democratic SA 
sought to become part of the international trade community by joining the WTO. Despite having 
had little interaction with the outside world, 554 its trade policy had to quickly conform to the global 
standards demanded of all members by the WTO. 555 Falling into line with WTO policies and 
procedures was dangerous for a country in a weak economic position. The sudden change in its 
trade position had negative impacts on its agricultural sector which are still felt today, almost 20 
years later. South Africa became a WTO member556  and party to the AoA, and signed the TDCA 
in a relatively short period of time. The shift from an agricultural sector that was largely 
unregulated to a regulated and open market system was a considerable one. As highlighted in 
chapter 4, this has drastic effects on farmers and others.557 It has been argued that the swift about 
turn in the trading relationship between SA and the rest of the world, especially the EU was a 
beacon of new hope at the time; this researcher agrees with this viewpoint to some extent. 
However, as the current study has shown, the long term effects might have been more damaging 
especially when the intricate clauses of the TDCA are analyzed. Thus, in hindsight, it could be 
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argued that SA should have assessed its own economic progress before committing itself to the 
WTO and its far-reaching policies as well as signing the TDCA.  
 
As noted previously, South Africa was accustomed to a closed market system. The level of 
competition was low and the quality of consumer goods was high as most goods did not leave the 
country as is the case now.558  The acceptance and signing of the WTO brought about immediate 
and swift access to the market. South Africa traders were now operating in an open system. The 
TDCA further enhanced this situation by making market access a key component of the agreement. 
This is submitted to have put SA in a dangerous position as the open market created a situation 
many farmers did not know how to deal with. Richer companies were able to export and profit, 
and local farmers suffered in the long run as their previous competitors, local larger companies 
were now joined by foreign producers.559 
 
This study has shown that SA did not only import products that were not available in the country 
but goods that were readily available. Producers that previously had little competition due to the 
closed trading system SA was part off, were now forced to compete with multinational companies 
from different parts of the world.560 Farmers had to adapt to this change that happened too fast for 
them to keep up with. Thus, it is argued that when SA entered the free trade market, it should have 
been more cautious as to how fast it opened up its system. It did not do so gradually, but all in one 
go, this can be seen in the market access provisions of the TDCA. A more gradual transition might 
have been more suited to its needs. Given that the die has been cast, SA should try to undo some 
of the open access market areas to strengthen local markets. Open market access that is a product 
of trade liberalisation has certain positive aspects.561 However, the access enjoyed by the EU and 
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SA is disproportionate despite WTO regulations and the AoA. While the implementation periods 
for the various agreements, especially the TDCA stretch over a number of years, it is submitted 
that irrespective of the length of the period, SA’s initial position and the ill-considered policies 
that it introduced would have caused trade barriers for SA. 
 
5.2.2. Subsidies 
Subsidies have been by far been the most controversial aspect of the agreement. The research has 
shown that the amount granted for each commodity in different countries differs significantly 
depending on financial resources and trade policy.562 Further, it was shown that the EU spends 
almost five times what SA allocates to subsidies,563 with serious consequences for the latter 
country’s farmers and producers.  
 
The TDCA will not succeed in leveling the playing field as long as this situation persists, despite 
the fact that SA might receive development aid from the EU.564 It can be argued that the aid 
dynamic of the agreement is a smoke screen to disguise the bigger problem of subsidies. The large 
amounts the EU spends on subsidies could be transformed into developmental aid with benefits 
for both parties.  
 
The EU would be able to obtain cheaper products from SA as the aid could be used to subsidise 
farmers. The suggestion that the EU reduce subsidies for farmers to bring European countries more 
in line with the AoA appears to be stuck at the level of rhetoric given that such subsidies increased 
threefold over a three year period.565 Subsidies are an issue in relation to both the AoA and 
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TDCA.566 While the AoA sets out clear provisions on how subsidies should work567 and requires 
country specific schedules, it does not regulate how subsidies may be granted within a community 
of countries like the EU. This has enabled the EU to privilege French farmers that receive the 
largest portion of its subsidies. Reform is urgently required to address this issue.568 
 
It has been argued within the EU itself that the way subsidies are distributed is unfair.569 Eight-
nine per cent go to large agribusinesses that dominate the market.570 They harness their resources 
and technology to keep prices low, making it difficult for both local EU and South African farmers 
to compete.571 Subsidies have come under further scrutiny following an increase in the amount 
when a decrease was committed to.572 This situation calls for improved monitoring and for pressure 
to be brought to bear on the EU to abide by its commitments, resulting in a more fair global trade 
system, in respect of agriculture.  
 
It is thus recommended that additional categories be added to the green, amber and blue boxes that 
differentiate between the type or nature of the producer, the needs of the producer and the domestic 
growth of the industry that would occur as a result of the growth of producers. Should this not be 
achievable at the level of the AoA and the WTO; SA and the EU should seriously consider it is 
decided to renegotiate the TDCA. 
 
5.2.3 Health Standards 
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While all States are said to be equal, international trade demonstrates that this is not the case. The 
power dynamics between nations and their different financial status mean that some States have 
higher standards than others. Different health standards have had a major effect on agricultural 
trade.573 
 
The case study of the pineapples in chapter 4574 shows that developing countries are not on par 
with developed nations in terms of technological advances in the agricultural sector. They thus 
rely on imported fertilizers575 and opt for those that cost the least. In the South African pineapple 
farmers’ case, this resulted in them violating the EU’s health standards and losing out on the 
European market.576 To realize the TDCA’s objective of economic development, health standards 
should be revisited, not with a view to lowering them, but to ensure effective communication or 
standardisation to ensuring consistent practices in the EU and SA. 
 
The quest for market access requires farmers in developing countries to adopt more commercial 
production practices.577 South African farmers are using excessive amounts of fertilizer to be able 
to produce more.578 Again, this calls for reconsideration of the health standards; if something is 
bad for EU citizens, why is it good enough for South Africans? The EU also imposes standards 
which, as in the case of oranges that were feared to have black spot, led to a ban on all citrus 
imports.579 These issues should be considered if and when the agreement comes under review. 
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Job creation through economic growth is one of the key pillars of the AoA as well as the TDCA.580 
Many developing countries rely on WTO agreements to advance their industries; especially 
because they depend on low end labour intensive markets due to outsourcing by the developed 
world as can be seen in the ‘sweat shops’ in the Far East.581 WTO agreements such as the AoA 
should aim to grow local industries and small scale businesses. However, business exchanges 
occur only between those with capital to spare. While European investors can afford to enter South 
African markets, as can those from the USA with companies like Walmart taking over major 
businesses in South Africa,582 the opposite is not true. 
 
The example of Parmalat in chapter 4583 shows how a large multinational is able to enter SA and 
source inputs from partners in their home country, destroying the business of local suppliers. 
Furthermore, its profits are exported to the home country and local investors cannot compete with 
multinationals. While foreign investment is sorely needed in SA, can the country afford to make 
such compromises that violate the spirit of the TDCA?  It is therefore recommended that the TDCA 
reconsider/reexamine the way EU companies and investors interact with South African companies 
and addresses the sustenance of local and emerging producers and commercial farmers. It needs 
to strike a balance between the need for foreign investment and the need for profit driven markets 
that contribute to domestic growth.  
 
Oxfam International rightly points to the disjuncture between what is said during negotiations and 
what comes after agreement has been reached.584  The goals and objectives of the WTO and the 
parties involved in a particular agreement need to be reflected throughout the course of the 
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agreement.585 The TDCA is a case in point as the developmental aspects of the agreement are not 
being achieved. Certain of its clauses on market access and business access need to be revisited. 
 
5.2.5 Problems for SACU 
The problem with bilateral agreements between two dominant parties or states is that they have an 
indirect or direct effect on other trade partners. The TDCA has negatively affected SACU members 
especially, the BLNS States. Keet586 notes that, as trade becomes easier between the EU and SA, 
trade with SACU members decreases due to the free trade agreement. Thus, SA effectively 
becomes a portal for the EU to enter sub-Saharan Africa. From a policy point of view not much 
can be done to remedy this situation. Therefore it is proposed that when entering into such 
agreements in future, parties that will be directly affected should be consulted or even included in 
the negotiations process. This would ensure that regional cooperation remains intact. 
 
5.2.6 Benefits and disadvantages 
The benefits of the WTO, AoA and TDCA cannot be ignored. The WTO has single handedly 
changed the face of international trade. An international body that regulates trade and that is able 
to adjudicate on disputes is crucial in the current political and economic environment. The WTO 
has ensured States at least commit to greater and more open trade which is to the benefit of all, but 
the lack of practical implementation by States is of concern and there is a need to review the AoA. 
 
More so, since the AoA is able to bring together and allow agriculture to become a focus of trade. 
Too often in the past, agriculture; which is the driving force behind human existence, was side 
tracked while more “important” aspects of trade were prioritised. The financial markets and 
exchanges rates together with commodities such as gold and oil often influenced economic and 
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trade engagements however life giving agricultural produce was ignored. The AoA has brought 
most countries up to speed. It has been able to differentiate clearly between developed countries, 
who are often the greatest exporters, and developing countries who by enlarge import; yet are 
known to be farming dependent countries. The agreement is unapologetic in its aims at trying to 
level out the playing field between the different economic statuses of countries, how they interact 
and how they are able to benefit from their relationships. This is extremely important especially in 
a global economy where history is to blame for many of the inequalities that exist today. 
 
Robin, Sherwin and Theirfield praise the TDCA for its beneficial effects on SA which cannot be 
disputed.587 However, Assarson argues that these are short lived and become disadvantages within 
a relatively short period of time.588 The rapid growth in South African exports to countries like 
Germany and Sweden could taper off as trade stabilises. Trade diversions will not solve all the 
problems.589 Furthermore, it should always be remembered that the agreement has created vast 
wealth for the EU. 
 
It was also concluded that although the TDCA has some positive benefits for SA it has had 
detrimental effects, particularly in the agricultural sector which outweigh the benefits. This is not 
to suggest that the AoA works solely to the benefit of the EU, but that due to the EU’s bargaining 
power, SA is the weaker partner and thus stands to benefit less. In the long run, while the AoA has 
changed the trade relationship between SA and EU, it has not worked as planned because bi-lateral 
agreements between States, although within the ambit of WTO agreements, give States autonomy 
and the power relations between them affect the outcome of such agreements. 
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This study analyzed international trade by considering the way the WTO functions and how 
agreements are concluded. It focused on the AoA and its impact on agricultural trade by analyzing 
how the agreement impacts relations between SA and the EU. 
 
The study found that, although the WTO seeks to put all States on the same level, economic and 
political power has made this a difficult task with countries from the Global North dominating 
decision making. 
 
Conclusively, agriculture is the back bone of any society, making the AoA an important agreement. 
However, if food is not regarded as a necessity but rather as an economic tool, agricultural trade 
will be motivated by profit rather than survival. People and their livelihoods should be the central 
focus of the agreement by treating all States the same and providing them with free and fair 
opportunities. If we are to address the issues of poverty and famine, agriculture policies need to be 
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